



G O O D W I N  L I U  
State Courts and Constitutional Structure 
51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American  
Constitutional Law 
B Y  J E F F R E Y  S .  S U T T O N  
O X F O R D  U N I V E R S I T Y  P R E S S ,  2 0 1 8  
abstract.  In a famous 1977 article, Justice William Brennan called on state courts to interpret 
the individual-rights provisions of their state constitutions more expansively than analogous fed-
eral guarantees. Over the years, state constitutions have served as the foundation for important 
individual-rights decisions, yet their provisions remain unfamiliar to and often ignored by lawyers, 
scholars, and judges. In an insightful new book, 51 Imperfect Solutions: The Making of American 
Constitutional Law, Judge Jeffrey Sutton renews Justice Brennan’s call for judicial federalism but 
recasts it in a number of important ways.  Most significantly, he invites us to understand state 
constitutionalism not solely or primarily as a liberal ratchet, but instead as a structural feature of 
our governmental system that modulates the timing, process, and substance of individual-rights 
enforcement. The conventional focus on the federal judiciary as the principal locus of rights inno-
vation, he explains, does not accord with our constitutional history and disserves both state and 
federal courts. Urging greater balance between state and federal courts in protecting individual 
rights, Judge Sutton treats state constitutionalism as a mechanism for channeling constitutional 
debate in a diverse democracy and mitigating the risks of winner-take-all decision-making by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
Judge Sutton’s account of state constitutionalism is neither liberal nor conservative, and offers 
a nuanced and multifaceted view of how state courts have helped shape American constitutional 
law. But his insistence that state courts elaborate constitutional doctrine based on state-specific 
texts or histories is in tension with his salutary vision of robust constitutional dialogue between 
state and federal courts. Such dialogue historically has not arisen from a proliferation of state-
specific discourses. Instead, the richness of judicial federalism is most evident when state and fed-
eral courts are engaged in a single discourse, interpreting similar texts or principles in their respec-
tive constitutions within a common historical tradition or common framework of constitutional 
reasoning. This dynamic is at the core of the book’s case studies on the exclusionary rule, school-
funding inequality, forced sterilization, and mandatory flag salutes. Moreover, it is at the core of 
the judicial history of school segregation, which includes a more prominent role for state courts in 
protecting the rights of black schoolchildren than is commonly known. This history, which I elu-
cidate in this review, amplifies Judge Sutton’s call for renewed consideration of the basic purposes 
and premises of judicial federalism. 
 










author.  Associate Justice, California Supreme Court. For outstanding research assistance, I 
am indebted to Hillary Mimnaugh and Eric Chung. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I thank 
Eric Chung, Vicki Jackson, Guha Krishnamurthi, Carol Lee, Ricky Revesz, and Jeff Sutton. I am 
also grateful for opportunities to present and discuss these ideas with law students and faculty at 
Duke, George Washington, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale. Finally, I appreciate the patience and 








book review contents 
INTRODUCTION 1307 
i.  judicial federalism reconsidered 1312 
A.  Equality and Adequacy of School Funding  1314 
B.  The Exclusionary Rule 1315 
C.  Compelled Sterilization 1318 
D.  Mandatory Flag Salutes 1320 
ii.  the making of american constitutional law 1325 
iii. state courts and school segregation 1340 
A.  Separate but Equal 1341 
B.  Pro-integration Voices 1345 
C.  The Road to Brown 1352 
D.  After Brown 1360 
conclusion 1365 
  
state courts and constitutional structure 
1307 
I N T R O D U C T IO N 
The first time I encountered Jeff Sutton was at the U.S. Supreme Court on 
October 11, 2000. I was a new law clerk and Judge Sutton, then a lawyer in pri-
vate practice, was at the podium arguing on behalf of the State of Alabama in 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.
1
 The question was 
whether Congress, in enacting Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA),
2
 had validly exercised its enforcement power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and thereby abrogated state immunity from suit for 
damages.
3
 In a five-to-four decision, the Court said no, reasoning that Congress 
had not documented a pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination 
by the states against persons with disabilities.
4
 The Court noted that “by the 
time that Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had en-
acted [laws providing special accommodations for persons with disabilities]. At 
least one Member of Congress remarked that ‘this is probably one of the few 
times where the States are so far out in front of the Federal Government, it’s not 
 
1. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). The Court is fortunate to have exceptional advocates appear in most cases, 
but even by that standard, Judge Sutton stood out for his command of detail, amiable Mid-
western temperament, and unflappable focus in the face of tough questioning. Judge Sutton 
ended up arguing four cases that Term and won victories in all of them. The other three cases 
were Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), in which the Court found no private right of 
action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964; Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001), in which the Court agreed with Judge 
Sutton, as Court-appointed counsel, that a pro se prisoner’s failure to timely sign a notice of 
appeal was not a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal; and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 
533 U.S. 525 (2001), in which the Court invalidated most, though not all, of Massachusetts’s 
regulations restricting the sale, promotion, and labeling of tobacco products on preemption 
and First Amendment grounds. 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2018); id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring employers to “mak[e] rea-
sonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise quali-
fied individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of 
the [employer’s] business”). 
3. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65, 72 (1996) (holding that Congress may 
not use its Commerce Clause powers to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity 
from suit for damages, as such abrogation can only occur through Congress’s enforcement 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
4. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368-72. 




 This legislative context, including the quoted remark, was extensively 
documented in Judge Sutton’s merits brief and highlighted at oral argument.
6
 
Garrett was the third in a trio of Section 5 cases in which Judge Sutton suc-
cessfully argued the states’ rights position. The previous Term, he had prevailed 
in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, in which the Court held that application of 
the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act to the states exceeded Con-
gress’s enforcement power.
7
 And he prevailed in City of Boerne v. Flores, the sem-
inal 1997 decision invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s (RFRA) 
application to the states.
8
 Judge Sutton, correctly predicting that many states 
would enact their own RFRA analogs if RFRA itself were held inapplicable to 
the states, implored the Court: “Let the states be the principal bulwark when it 
comes to protecting civil liberties.”
9
 
In all three cases, Judge Sutton sounded the same theme: a national solution, 
however commendable its objective, “in the end would pose more threats to the 
cause of liberty than it would cure.”
10
 Whether or not one agrees with the 
Court’s holdings, one thing is certain: for more than two decades, Jeff Sutton—
as a lawyer, scholar, and judge—has been a serious student of federalism and one 
of its most thoughtful expositors. Unlike those on the right and the left who 
expediently invoke federalism when it suits their policy views,
11
 Judge Sutton is 
a true believer in Madison’s insight that dividing power “between two distinct 
governments,” in addition to dividing power within each government, is vital to 
securing our basic rights and liberties.
12
 His new book, 51 Imperfect Solutions: 
 
5. Id. at 368 n.5 (citation omitted). The Court noted that “[a] number of these [state] provisions, 
however, did not go as far as the ADA did in requiring accommodation.” Id. 
6. Brief for Petitioners at 2-7, 30-33, Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (No. 99-1240); Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument at 7, 18-19, Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (No. 99-1240). Judge Sutton’s brief included an ap-
pendix citing all fifty states’ laws. 
7. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
8. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Judge Sutton, then Solicitor General of Ohio, argued the case “by special 
leave of the Court” after filing an amicus curiae brief on behalf of sixteen states and territories 
in support of the City of Boerne. Id. at 509; see also Brief for States of Ohio et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (No. 95-2074). 
9. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-26, 29, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (No. 95-2074). 
10. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 4. 
11. See Ilya Somin, No More Fair-Weather Federalism, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 18, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/08/limit-federal-power-left-right-can-agree 
[https://perma.cc/4HMK-JWES]. 
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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States and the Making of American Constitutional Law, powerfully elucidates this 
important feature of our constitutional structure.
13
 
The book argues that an accurate account of our constitutional history and 
doctrine must include not only the role of federal courts and the U.S. Constitu-
tion, but also what is often overlooked in legal education and scholarship: the 
role of state courts and state constitutions. Through careful historical analysis of 
how state and federal courts have shaped constitutional law on four issues—
school funding, the exclusionary rule, compulsory sterilization, and flag-salute 
mandates—Judge Sutton paints a more complex picture of how constitutional 
doctrine evolves than conventional accounts that focus primarily on U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions. He writes: 
The point of telling these American constitutional law stories in full . . . 
[is] to illustrate the risks of relying too heavily on the U.S. Supreme 
Court as the guardian of our rights, to show that the state supreme courts 
at times have been committed defenders of our rights, and to confirm 
that the right balance between the state and federal courts when it comes 
to rights protection is deeply complicated . . . .
14
 
The “critical conviction of this book,” he explains, is that “a chronic underappre-
ciation of state constitutional law has been hurtful to state and federal law and 




Scholarship by federal judges on state courts and state constitutionalism is a 
limited genre, and Judge Sutton’s book invites comparison to Justice William 
 
13. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (2018) [hereinafter SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS]. The book synthe-
sizes and builds on his numerous articles on related topics. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Barnette, 
Frankfurter, and Judicial Review, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 133 (2012); Jeffrey S. Sutton, San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963 (2008); Jef-
frey S. Sutton, What Does—and Does Not—Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 687 
(2011) [hereinafter Sutton, What Does]; Jeffrey S. Sutton, Why Teach—and Why Study—State 
Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165 (2009); Jeffrey S. Sutton & Brittany Jones, 
The Certiorari Process and State Court Decisions, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 167 (2018); Jeffrey S. Sut-
ton, Courts as Change Agents: Do We Want More—or Less?, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (2014) (re-
viewing EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CON-
STITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013)). Judge Sutton has also coauthored 
a textbook on state constitutional law, see RANDY J. HOLLAND ET AL., STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: THE MODERN EXPERIENCE (2d ed. 2015), and regularly teaches a course on state consti-
tutional law at Harvard Law School. 
14. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 190. 
15. Id. at 174. 
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Brennan’s famous 1977 article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights.
16
 Justice Brennan’s sensibilities trace back to his five years of service on 
the New Jersey Supreme Court and to his leadership role in drafting the 1947 
New Jersey Constitution, which “came to be viewed nationally as a model state 
constitution.”
17
 Judge Sutton earned his law degree at The Ohio State Univer-
sity, practiced for several years in Columbus, and served four years as Solicitor 
General of Ohio. The daily controversies he encountered in that latter role deeply 
shaped his perspectives on federalism.
18
 
While echoing Justice Brennan’s main thesis that state courts can and must 
interpret their constitutions independently of the Federal Constitution,
19
 51 Im-
perfect Solutions deepens our understanding of judicial federalism in a number of 
ways. Part I of this Review provides an overview of the book and contrasts its 
main themes with those of Justice Brennan’s article. Whereas Justice Brennan 
largely conceived of state constitutionalism as a one-way ratchet for expanding 
individual rights, Judge Sutton presents a more nuanced view of state constitu-
tionalism as a structural feature of our governmental system that modulates the 
timing, process, and substance of individual-rights enforcement. By focusing on 
matters of structure and process, and not liberal or conservative results, 51 Im-
perfect Solutions helps to lessen the political valence that many observers have 
associated with judicial federalism in light of Justice Brennan’s article. 
 
16. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489 (1977). 
17. Robert F. Williams, Justice Brennan, the New Jersey Supreme Court, and State Constitutions: The 
Evolution of a State Constitutional Consciousness, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 763, 772 (1998); see also Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guard-
ians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Aspects of 
Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945 (1964). 
18. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at vii-ix. He brought this perspective to bear 
in City of Boerne by illuminating RFRA’s sweeping effects on prison administration, educa-
tion, highway improvement, and other core functions of state governance. See Brief for States 
of Ohio et al., supra note 8, at 2-7. The Court apparently took note. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (explaining that RFRA’s “[s]weeping coverage ensures its intrusion 
at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every 
description and regardless of subject matter”). 
Judge Sutton did have some early experiences at the federal level: he served as a law clerk 
to Judge Thomas Meskill on the Second Circuit and was then hired by retired Justice Lewis 
Powell and worked primarily for Justice Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia once acknowledged that 
he hired his clerks almost invariably from elite schools but noted “one sort-of exception”: “I 
wouldn’t have hired Jeff Sutton . . . . For God’s sake, he went to Ohio State! And he’s one of 
the very best law clerks I ever had.” Adam Liptak, On the Bench and off, the Eminently Quotable 
Justice Scalia, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/us/12bar
.html [https://perma.cc/P68B-HNVQ]. 
19. See SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 16; Brennan, supra note 16, at 502. 
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Part II of this Review addresses a persistent question in discussions of state 
constitutionalism: on what grounds may state courts depart from federal prece-
dent when interpreting similarly worded constitutional provisions? Judge Sut-
ton calls on state courts to develop a more probing and sustained discourse on 
distinctive state texts and histories. Although this approach is illuminating and 
dispositive in many cases, there are many areas in which it is not, including the 
four issues that Judge Sutton explores to showcase dynamic interactions between 
state and federal courts. What his narrations of those issues show is not a prolif-
eration of state-specific discourses, but rather a single discourse in which state 
and federal courts are jointly engaged in interpreting shared texts or shared prin-
ciples within a common historical tradition or common framework of constitu-
tional reasoning. When a state court decides, for example, what is an “unreason-
able search” under its state constitution independently of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, there is a certain redundancy 
in interpretive authority. This redundancy makes innovation and variation pos-
sible and, for that reason, is a vital feature of our federal system. The legitimacy 
of independent state constitutionalism rests on basic structural postulates, not 
necessarily on the development of state-centric constitutional discourse. And it 
is precisely in those areas where state courts do not employ state-specific reason-
ing that their decisions have influence beyond their borders and contribute to 
the making of American constitutional law. 
Part III examines the common perception that state courts are less protective 
of individual rights than federal courts. Judge Sutton observes that the “most 
conspicuous” source of this perception is the states’ role as the “policy villains” 
in Jim Crow.
20
 “Why seek relief from institutions that created the individual-
rights vacuum in the first place?,” the argument goes.
21
 There is indeed no short-
age of bad actors at the state level in the annals of our civil rights history, and 
Brown v. Board of Education was a singular triumph for the U.S. Supreme Court.
22
 
But a careful look at the role of state courts in addressing school segregation 
yields a more complicated picture. State courts made important contributions 
not only to establishing the separate-but-equal doctrine but also to resisting or 
limiting it. State courts were integral to the doctrine’s demise in Brown, and 
some have since gone beyond federal standards in combatting racial segregation 
in our public schools. I do not suggest that state courts were unsung heroes of 
the civil rights movement or that they were generally in the vanguard of efforts 
to dismantle school segregation. But this history, rarely if ever taught in law 
school (and not addressed in Judge Sutton’s book), suggests that state courts 
 
20. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at viii. 
21. Id. at 15. 
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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played a greater role in protecting the rights of black schoolchildren than com-
monly thought. The judicial history of school segregation amplifies Judge Sut-
ton’s call for renewed consideration of the basic purposes and premises of judi-
cial federalism. 
i .  judicial federalism reconsidered 
Justice Brennan’s State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights is 
one of the most cited law review articles of all time.
23
 In a mere sixteen pages, 
the article covers a lot of ground. It begins by describing the general rise of fed-
eral law in the wake of the Great Depression and during the civil rights move-
ment.
24
 It discusses the transformation of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine as a 
result of Brown v. Board of Education, new understandings of “‘liberty’ and ‘prop-
erty’ in light of conditions existing in contemporary society,” and the incorpora-
tion of various Bill of Rights provisions against the states.
25
 Justice Brennan then 
documents “a trend in recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court to 
pull back from” the Warren Court’s expansive interpretations of due process and 
equal protection.
26
 It is against this backdrop that Justice Brennan calls on state 
courts to interpret their state constitutions to provide greater protections for in-
dividual rights.
27
 “With federal scrutiny diminished,” he writes, “state courts 
must respond by increasing their own.”
28
 
This unabashed advocacy of state constitutionalism as a liberal ratchet, in-
tended to continue the Warren Court’s protection of individual rights, was 
cheered by many
29
 but criticized by others for being activist and results-ori-
ented.
30
 The impetus for Justice Brennan’s call for state constitutionalism was 
 
23. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. 
L. REV. 1483, 1489 tbl.1 (2012) (ranking Justice Brennan’s article ninth, with 1,701 citations). 
24. Brennan, supra note 16, at 489-91. 
25. Id. at 491-95. 
26. Id. at 495-98. 
27. Id. at 498-503. 
28. Id. at 503. 
29. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading 
Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1-35 (1995); Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitu-
tions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 707-22 (1983); David 
Margolick, State Judges Are Shaping Law That Goes Beyond Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 
19, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/05/19/us/state-judges-are-shaping-law-that 
-goes-beyond-supreme-court-courts-trial-last.html [https://perma.cc/6T2C-UJA8]. 
30. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 605, 605-06 n.1 (1981); Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions—Away 
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the more than three dozen decisions from 1971 to 1976 in which he dissented,
31
 
and his article applauds state courts that “have independently considered the 
merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow opinions of the United 
States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even where the state and federal 
constitutions are similarly or identically phrased.”
32
 His examples include a New 
Jersey Supreme Court decision holding that in order to establish that a suspect 
not in custody has consented to a search, the state must prove the suspect knew 
he had a right to refuse consent;
33
 Hawaii and Pennsylvania high court decisions 
holding that a suspect’s statements taken without Miranda warnings are inad-
missible for impeachment purposes;
34
 a Michigan Supreme Court decision hold-
ing that a suspect is entitled to counsel at any pretrial lineup or photographic 
identification procedure;
35
 and Alaska and Maine high court decisions holding 
that defendants have a right to trial by jury even for petty offenses.
36
 
Four decades later, Judge Sutton returns us to the thesis that “state courts no 
less than federal are and ought to be the guardians of our liberties.”
37
 However, 
in contrast to Justice Brennan’s unidimensional view of state constitutionalism 
as a corrective for rights-restrictive decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Judge 
Sutton presents a multifaceted account of the role of state courts in the develop-
ment of American constitutional law, both state and federal. No one would call 
Judge Sutton a judicial liberal, and 51 Imperfect Solutions is not devoted to max-
imizing individual rights. Instead, Judge Sutton treats state constitutionalism as 
a structural mechanism for American constitutional law to develop in a manner 
that accounts for “differences in culture, geography, and history,”
38
 fosters a di-
 
from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 2-3 (1981); Earl M. Maltz, False 
Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
429, 434 (1988). 
31. Brennan, supra note 16, at 495-98 & nn.39-60 (citing cases). 
32. Id. at 500. 
33. State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66 (N.J. 1975) (declining to follow Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218 (1973)). 
34. State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Haw. 1971) (declining to follow Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222 (1971)); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975) (same); see Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
35. People v. Jackson, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27-28 (Mich. 1974) (declining to follow United States v. 
Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973)). 
36. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970) (declining to follow Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974) (same). 
37. Brennan, supra note 16, at 491; see SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 204 
(warning of “the risk of relying too heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court as the sole guardian 
of our liberties”). 
38. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 17. 
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versity of approaches to difficult questions instead of “winner-take-all solu-
tions,”
39
 facilitates experimentation that is “easier to correct,”
40
 and allows “the 




In Judge Sutton’s view, there are times when state constitutionalism can and 
should serve as an antidote for misguided decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
But that is not its only role. Judge Sutton invites us to consider state courts and 
state law as key parts of the dynamic process by which constitutional doctrine 
develops over time. That process is important not only for its outcomes with 
regard to individual-rights enforcement, but also for its pacing of doctrinal 




In particular, Judge Sutton understands judicial federalism as a feature of our 
constitutional structure that “might ease the pressure on the U.S. Supreme Court 
to be the key rights innovator in modern America” and mitigate the “long-term 
risks with the national judicialization of so many American policies.”
43
 In his 
account, the U.S. Supreme Court is often correct to leave individual-rights en-
forcement to state courts and state law; state courts have often taken the lead in 
protecting individual rights, contrary to conventional wisdom; the U.S. Su-
preme Court sometimes makes wrong decisions in part because it overlooks de-
cisions of state courts; and the development of American constitutional law is 
stunted when state courts give too much deference to federal precedent in inter-
preting their state constitutions. Judge Sutton elaborates these themes through 
four legal narratives that comprise the main body of his book. 
A. Equality and Adequacy of School Funding  
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez held that public-school-funding disparities based on local property 
taxation do not violate equal protection of the laws.
44
 Judge Sutton poses this 
question: given the raft of state court decisions on education funding and legis-
lative reforms over the past forty-five years, did the plaintiffs in Rodriguez end 
 
39. Id. at 18. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 20. 
42. Id. at 208 (“In many areas of law affected by changing social norms, the most important ques-
tion is not whether but when, not whether but by whom.”). 
43. Id. at 214. 
44. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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up “gain[ing] more in the long run by losing their case than they stood to gain 
by winning it”?
45
 The principal effect of Rodriguez, he observes, was to shift “ac-
countability over educational funding . . . to the States”; as a result, “the political 
pressures at the state level increased—to considerable effect.”
46
 “As of today, 
every State has enacted a school-financing equalization scheme of one form or 
another,” and many states have established a minimum-funding guarantee to 
ensure an adequate education for all students.
47
 “One can fairly wonder,” Judge 
Sutton writes, “whether the reforms developed by fifty state legislatures and re-
quired by twenty-eight state supreme courts over the last forty-five years would 
have been as far-reaching if the Rodriguez Court had not shifted the spotlight on 
this issue to the States.”
48
 
While acknowledging that state reforms have not addressed all the problems 
identified in the Rodriguez litigation, Judge Sutton argues that any victory the 
Rodriguez plaintiffs might have won would have been “diluted by the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s institutional constraints,” resulting in “a federalism discount to 
[the Court’s] articulation of the constitutional right and remedy.”
49
 In light of 
the sheer complexity of school finance and the Court’s reluctance to impose a 
national solution, he contends, “in some cases, the States may have done more 




B. The Exclusionary Rule 
In 1961, the U.S. Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio held that evidence obtained 
in violation of a criminal defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be used in the State’s case-in-chief.
51
 
Judge Sutton discusses case law before and after Mapp as an example of how 
“constitutional law can be, and should be, interactive between the States and the 
national government,” with “state and federal courts respond[ing] to strengths 




45. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 41. 
46. Id. at 37. 
47. Id. at 29-30. 
48. Id. at 37. 
49. Id. at 36-37. 
50. Id. at 41. 
51. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
52. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 67. 
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Early American practice, state and federal, followed the common law rule 
that competent evidence, no matter how obtained, is admissible in a criminal 
trial. The remedy for an illegal search was a trespass action for damages or a 
replevin action for return of the property, rather than the exclusion of the ille-
gally obtained evidence at trial.
53
 When the U.S. Supreme Court applied the ex-
clusionary rule to federal prosecutions in the early twentieth century,
54
 state 
prosecutions were unaffected because the Fourth Amendment had not been held 
applicable to the states, and most state courts did not adopt the exclusionary rule 
under their own laws.
55
 The leading state case was People v. Defore, in which 
Judge Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the New York Court of Appeals, rejected 
the rule that “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”
56
 
Concerned that “[t]he pettiest peace officer would have it in his power, through 
overzeal or indiscretion, to confer immunity upon an offender for crimes the 
most flagitious,”
57
 Judge Cardozo sided with the weight of state authority 
(thirty-one jurisdictions had rejected an exclusionary rule while fourteen had 
adopted it) and concluded that the legislature, not the judiciary, is the better fo-
rum for balancing “the social need that crime shall be repressed” against “the 
social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office.”
58
 
Two decades after Defore, in 1949, the U.S. Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado 
held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states but declined to require the 
remedy of exclusion because it “was not derived from the explicit requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment.”
59
 At the time, thirty-one states had rejected the rule 
while sixteen had adopted it.
60
 Citing Judge Cardozo’s “[w]eighty” opinion in 
Defore, the Court said: “We cannot brush aside the experience of States which 
deem the incidence of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent 
 
53. Id. at 43-47. 
54. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383 (1914). While acknowledging that later cases have cited Weeks as the first case 
applying the exclusionary rule, Judge Sutton observes that Weeks did not involve the exclusion 
of illegally obtained evidence from a criminal trial but rather a timely pretrial motion for the 
return of property that was wrongfully taken. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 
13, at 53-55; see id. at 54 (explaining that Weeks “stood by the common law rule, not the inno-
vation of exclusion”). 
55. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 56. 
56. 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
57. Id. at 588. 
58. Id. at 589; see also id. at 587 (canvassing state authorities); id. at 588 (opining that the legisla-
ture can easily amend the search and seizure statute if the court misread it). 
59. 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). 
60. Id. at 29. 
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remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules 
of evidence.”
61
 But state experience was changing. By 1961, as Mapp observed, 
more than half the states had adopted an exclusionary rule in some form.
62
 In 
particular, Mapp quoted the California Supreme Court’s observation in People v. 
Cahan, a decision authored by Justice Roger Traynor, that “other remedies have 
completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions.”
63
 The 
“experience of other States,” together with intervening federal decisions, led 
Mapp to overrule Wolf and declare that “time has set its face against what Wolf 
called the ‘weighty testimony’ of [Defore].”
64
 
Judge Sutton narrates this progression to illustrate the interaction between 
state and federal courts in “a healthy system of judicial federalism.”
65
 The period 
from 1949 to 1961 “provided more empirical information about the pros and 
cons of exclusion” and “allowed more States to develop exclusionary rules . . . 
under their own constitutions.”
66
 “[I]f the U.S. Supreme Court wishes to inno-
vate new constitutional rights” based on evolving norms, he writes, “there is 
something to be said for the Mapp process and the Mapp timeline as the way to 
do it,”
67
 although he acknowledges that some might see the twelve years between 




61. Id. at 31-32. 
62. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 
(1960)). 
63. Id. (quoting People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (Cal. 1955)). 
64. Id. at 652, 653. 
65. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 81. 
66. Id. at 69. 
67. Id. at 68. 
68. Id. The same debate attends the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1 (1967), to invalidate laws against interracial marriage, more than a decade after the Court 
had the chance but declined to do so in Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). At the time of 
Naim, more than half the states had antimiscegenation statutes. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 
749, 753 (Va. 1955). By the time of Loving, only sixteen such statutes remained. Loving, 388 
U.S. at 6. Did the Court wait too long? Or not long enough? One could ask the same questions 
about same-sex marriage. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (decid-
ing the issue after “years” of “ongoing dialogue” among federal and state courts), with id. at 
2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[The Court] seizes for itself a question the Constitution 
leaves to the people, at a time when the people are engaged in a vibrant debate on that ques-
tion.”), and DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014) (Sutton, J.) (characterizing 
the legalization of gay marriage in nineteen states and the District of Columbia since 2003 as 
“a difficult timeline to criticize as unworthy of further debate and voting”). 
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But even more provocative is Judge Sutton’s analysis of what happened after 
Mapp: the dilution of the exclusionary rule through the good-faith exception,
69
 
the bar on federal habeas relief based on Fourth Amendment claims,
70
 the ex-
emption of grand jury proceedings
71
 and civil proceedings
72
 from the exclusion-
ary rule, and a rule of nonretroactivity applicable to Mapp
73
 and then extended 
to other constitutional rulings.
74
 These rulings illustrate the hydraulic relation-
ship between rights and remedies. Since Mapp, the dynamic that Daryl Levinson 
calls “remedial equilibration”
75
 as applied to Fourth Amendment rights has been 
mediated by one Court for the entire nation. It is not obvious, Judge Sutton con-
tends, that Mapp has led to greater protections for criminal suspects overall: 
“Only after Mapp, only after its perceived intrusion on the States’ long-held au-
thority to investigate and prosecute crime without federal interference, did the 
Court think to apply a federalism discount to the exclusionary rule, one that lim-
ited its reach in state and federal prosecutions.”
76
 Here Judge Sutton returns to 
the question he posed about Rodriguez: “[O]ne potential price of a nationwide 
exclusionary rule—or a nationwide rule on any constitutional right—may be a 
nationwide ebbing of the underlying standard, if not cutbacks on other consti-
tutional rights and principles. Is this price worth the cost?”
77
 
C. Compelled Sterilization 
As another example of the risks of deciding a controversial issue in a national 
forum, Judge Sutton traces the eugenics movement before and after Justice 
 
69. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
70. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
71. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
72. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). 
73. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
74. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (applying Linkletter in holding the right to counsel in 
confrontations for identification purposes to be nonretroactive); Tehan v. United States ex rel. 
Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (applying Linkletter in holding the prohibition on adverse com-
ment by a prosecutor or trial judge upon a defendant’s failure to testify to be nonretroactive). 
75. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 
(1999). 
76. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 71 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (“As to 
federal criminal defendants, it’s difficult to believe that, without Mapp, there would have been 
a Leon [establishing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule], and if that’s right, that 
makes Mapp a net loss when it comes to protection from the federal government.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
77. Id. at 75. 
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Holmes’s infamous opinion upholding forced sterilization of “imbeciles” in Buck 
v. Bell.
78
 Before Buck, five state courts, beginning with an influential 1913 deci-
sion by the New Jersey Supreme Court, had invalidated compulsory sterilization 
laws under state or federal constitutional provisions.
79
 Against this backdrop, 
Judge Sutton reviews disturbing evidence that Buck was a collusive lawsuit 
brought by eugenics enthusiasts “to avoid constitutional losses in fifty state su-
preme courts”
80
 and that “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court from all appearances was a 
willing participant” in “a judicial charade.”
81
 Justice Holmes’s five-paragraph 
opinion in Buck does not mention any of the contrary state court decisions. 
Although state courts remained free to invalidate compulsory sterilization 
laws under their state constitutions, “most of the state courts fell in line after 
Buck.”
82
 Even after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1942 decision in Skinner v. Okla-
 
78. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”). 
79. See SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 96-107 (discussing Smith v. Bd. of 
Exam’rs of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963 (N.J. 1913), and similar cases in Michigan, New York, 
Oregon, and Indiana). Judge Sutton also notes two federal district court decisions invalidat-
ing forced sterilization laws. See id. at 94-96 (discussing Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. 
Nev. 1918)); id. at 105-06 (discussing Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914)). Only one 
decision before Buck had upheld such a law against constitutional challenge, and that case 
involved a criminal defendant who was likely wrongly convicted and ultimately pardoned, 
though not before he was sterilized. See id. at 92-94 (discussing State v. Feilen, 126 P. 75 
(Wash. 1912)). 
80. Id. at 108. After finding Carrie Buck “feebleminded” and ordering her sterilized, the Board of 
the Virginia Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded appointed a guardian who chose a for-
mer director of the Board, Irving Whitehead, to represent Buck. See id. at 109-10. As Judge 
Sutton recounts, “the trial was a sham.” Id. at 110. Whitehead “had approved many earlier 
sterilizations” and “made no effort to challenge the hereditary premises of eugenics 
[or] . . . the Colony’s assumptions that Carrie, her mother, and her daughter were themselves 
all feebleminded or particularly at risk of procreating.” Id. Researchers have found considera-
ble evidence, contrary to the trial record, that Carrie Buck and her daughter Vivian actually 
possessed normal intelligence, and that Carrie had been committed to the Colony by her par-
ents in order to cover up the fact that she had been raped and, as a result, had given birth out 
of wedlock. See id. at 110-11 (citing ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERI-
CAN EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK (2016) and PAUL A. LOMBARDO, 
THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL 
(2008)); see also People v. Barrett, 281 P.3d 753, 777-79 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (discussing Buck). 
81. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting LOMBARDO, supra note 80, at 56). 
82. Id. at 118; see id. at 118-19, 124-25 (discussing state court decisions following Buck in Kansas, 
Oregon, and North Carolina). 
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homa ex rel. Williamson
83
 eroded the doctrinal underpinnings of Buck, it took 
several more decades before various states repealed their sterilization laws; thou-
sands of forced sterilizations occurred in the interim.
84
 Judge Sutton concludes 
that the demise of the eugenics movement “almost assuredly came more slowly 
than it otherwise would have due to Holmes’s and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
clanging endorsement of eugenics policy.”
85
 This is what can happen, Judge Sut-
ton warns, when the Court decides a federal constitutional issue and state courts 




D. Mandatory Flag Salutes 
Judge Sutton’s final narrative concerns the validity of state and local policies 
requiring schoolchildren to salute the flag. In communities throughout the 
country, parents who were Jehovah’s Witnesses directed their children not to 
participate in the flag salute because, according to their faith, “[p]ledging fealty 
to anything but God, whether the object was a country, a leader, or a secular 
symbol, violated” several of the Ten Commandments.
87
 The issue arose repeat-
edly in state and federal courts before and during World War II, with the Wit-
nesses suffering “a wave of persecution with few rivals in American history.”
88
 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the expulsion of two Pennsylvania schoolchil-
dren for refusing to salute the flag in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,
89
 but 
then declared such policies unconstitutional three years later in West Virginia 




83. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that an Oklahoma statute authorizing forced sterilization of 
“habitual criminals,” with exceptions for certain offenders, including embezzlers, impinged 
on “one of the basic civil rights of man” and violated equal protection). 
84. See SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 124-25. 
85. Id. at 126. Of Justice Holmes, his colleagues Chief Justice William Howard Taft and Justice 
Louis Brandeis, and the others who joined the majority opinion in Buck, Judge Sutton writes, 
“[e]ven very good judges can have very bad ideas.” Id. at 128. Justice Pierce Butler dissented 
without opinion. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Butler, J., dissenting). 
86. See SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 118. 
87. Id. at 136. 
88. Id. at 137; see id. at 137-39 (documenting violent attacks on Jehovah’s Witnesses for their re-
fusal to salute the flag). 
89. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
90. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Three Justices in the Gobitis majority—Hugo Black, William Douglas, 
and Frank Murphy—changed their minds and joined Chief Justice Harlan Stone (who dis-
sented in Gobitis), and Justices Robert Jackson and Wiley Rutledge to comprise the majority 
in Barnette. 
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Judge Sutton contends that neither federal courts nor state courts “per-
form[ed] more admirably than the other in addressing these issues” during “a 
time of intense patriotic fervor.”
91
 Instead, “the cases show two court systems 
stumbling toward a correct answer.”
92
 Before Gobitis, the high courts of New 
Jersey, Massachusetts, Georgia, New York, Florida, and California had rejected 
state and federal constitutional challenges, largely on the ground that the flag 
salute was a patriotic, not religious, observance and therefore did not interfere 
with religious freedom.
93
 No state high court had declared mandatory flag sa-
lutes unconstitutional, although the New York Court of Appeals had granted 
relief in one case on procedural grounds.
94
 After Gobitis and before Barnette, amid 
increasing violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses, the high courts of Kansas, 
Washington, New Hampshire, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey granted 
relief in flag-salute challenges on the basis of their state constitutions or other 
state-law grounds.
95
 Judge Sutton acknowledges Barnette as “one of the great 
opinions in American legal history” but notes that  
[m]any of the stirring themes in the Jackson opinion had forerunners in 
the state court decisions, and he would have done well to mention 
them—not just for the sake of sharing credit but also for the sake of 
providing support for the First Amendment norms his opinion recog-
nizes, if not creates.
96
 
For Judge Sutton, the flag-salute cases show that “it’s perilous at times to 
place too much faith in judges to enforce constitutional guarantees.”
97
 This re-
ality “confirms the benefit . . . of having two sets of court systems tasked with 
enforcing two sets of constitutional guarantees independently,” if for no other 
 
91. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 169. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 153-60 (discussing Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 82 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1938); State ex rel. Bleich 
v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 190 So. 815 (Fla. 1939); Leoles v. Landers, 192 S.E. 218 (Ga. 1937); 
Nicholls v. Mayor of Lynn, 7 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1937); Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 189 A. 
629 (N.J. 1937); People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 18 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1939)). 
94. Sandstrom, 18 N.E.2d at 841-42, 844 (reversing the parents’ conviction on the ground that if 
discipline was to be meted out, it should have been directed at the student, not her parents). 
95. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 160-66 (discussing People v. Chiafreddo, 
44 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 1942); State v. Smith, 127 P.2d 518 (Kan. 1942); State v. Lefebvre, 20 A.2d 
185 (N.H. 1941); and Bolling v. Superior Court, 133 P.2d 803 (Wash. 1943)); id. at 166 n.225 
(citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 35 N.E.2d 801 (Mass. 1941) and In re Latrecchia, 26 A.2d 
881 (N.J. 1942)). 
96. Id. at 172. 
97. Id. at 170. 
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* * * 
Judge Sutton supplements these four historical narratives with brief discus-
sion of a few others: the wide-ranging state-level backlash to Kelo v. City of New 
London,
99
 a similar state legislative and judicial backlash to Employment Division 
v. Smith,
100
 and the recent history of same-sex marriage from Goodridge v. De-
partment of Public Health to Obergefell v. Hodges.
101
 Through these narratives, 
Judge Sutton paints a more nuanced picture of state courts and state constitu-
tionalism than Justice Brennan did forty years ago. Some aspects of the narra-
tives, such as the post-Gobitis state court decisions invalidating mandatory flag 
salutes under state constitutions, fit Justice Brennan’s vision of state courts step-
ping forward to mitigate mistakes by the U.S. Supreme Court. Judge Sutton’s 
criticism of state courts that fell in line behind Buck v. Bell, without inde-
pendently examining sterilization laws under their state constitutions, also fits 
the Brennan thesis. But other aspects of the narratives go beyond Justice Bren-
nan’s argument and add complexity to our understanding of judicial federalism. 
First, whereas Justice Brennan’s 1977 article largely conceived of state consti-
tutionalism as a second-best corrective for U.S. Supreme Court decisions that 
fail to properly vindicate individual rights, Judge Sutton’s account of the school-
funding decisions and Fourth Amendment doctrine invites us to consider 
whether state forums might yield the greatest or optimal level of rights protec-
tion, at least on some issues. Problems with a high level of practical complexity 
may not be amenable to national solutions or, if resolved by a national court, 





99. 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that the city’s exercise of eminent domain for economic-devel-
opment purposes satisfied the “public use” requirement of the Takings Clause); see SUTTON, 
51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 204-05 (discussing state constitutional decisions 
and legislation that “filled many, even if not all, of the gaps left by” Kelo). 
100. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious 
exercise do not violate the Free Exercise Clause so long as they have a rational basis); see SUT-
TON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 206-07 (discussing state constitutional deci-
sions and legislation requiring such laws to satisfy “strict scrutiny or at a minimum something 
more than rational basis”). 
101. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing same-sex cou-
ples’ right to marry under the Massachusetts Constitution); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015) (recognizing same-sex couples’ right to marry under the U.S. Constitution); see 
SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 207 (“There is no Obergefell without 
Goodridge.”). 
102. See SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 208. 
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shifting accountability to state courts may elicit responsive innovation on issues 




Second, even when an issue ultimately will be decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Judge Sutton shows how state constitutionalism can play an important 
role in the process of doctrinal change. State courts can serve as useful “first re-
sponders in addressing innovative rights claims,”
104
 such as the exclusionary rule 
or marriage equality, because a state constitutional decision is more limited in its 
impact than a federal constitutional decision and can be more easily overruled by 
constitutional amendment.
105
 Percolation of an issue through various state 
courts can provide valuable insights and options for the federal high court to 
draw on when it chooses to decide the issue. And an accumulation of state deci-
sions can provide an indication of “changing norms objectively provable beyond 
1 First Street.”
106
 So understood, state constitutionalism is not, as Justice Bren-
nan suggested, a way to backfill rights protections that the U.S. Supreme Court 
should have already recognized, but rather a key mechanism for prospectively 
shaping federal constitutional law and regulating the pace and timing of doctri-
nal change. On many issues, the U.S. Supreme Court should not be the first to 
decide, and state courts are a vital component of the process by which constitu-
tional law properly evolves. Judge Sutton envisions this “ground-up approach to 




Third, whereas Justice Brennan expressly situated state constitutionalism 
within a theory of living constitutionalism,
108
 Judge Sutton observes that 
“[r]enewing the States’ role in rights innovation offers benefits to all schools of 
 
103. See id. at 209 (“Some supposedly countermajoritarian constitutional issues are not counter-
majoritarian at all when presented effectively to elected state court judges . . . . That reality 
may explain why these education, criminal procedure, property-rights, free exercise, and 
eventually marriage issues resonated with some state-elected judges but not life-tenured fed-
eral judges.”). 
104. Id. at 212. 
105. See id. at 213; see also id. at 212 (“The risks of error associated with a state-first approach are 
fewer.”). 
106. Id. at 69. 
107. Id. at 216. 
108. See Brennan, supra note 16, at 495 (“[T]he genius of our Constitution resides not in any static 
meaning that it had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great prin-
ciples to cope with the problems of a developing America. A principle to be vital must be of 
wider application than the mischief that gave it birth.”). 




 For originalists, state court decisions that 
plumb the history of state constitutional provisions can provide useful guidance 
on the original public meaning of federal guarantees modeled on those state pro-
visions.
110
 For living constitutionalists, “new interpretations of state constitu-
tions by state court judges” can provide guidance for the U.S. Supreme Court on 
changing norms and mores.
111
 And for pragmatists, state court decisions can 
“show what works and what doesn’t.”
112
 
Finally, in contrast to Justice Brennan’s conception of state constitutionalism 
as “a liberal ratchet,” Judge Sutton correctly observes that “[t]here’s nothing 
about the state constitutions that necessarily points toward liberal or conserva-
tive rights.”
113
 Take, for example, the state constitutional decisions that have in-
terpreted property rights and religious freedom more expansively than Kelo and 
Smith, respectively. State courts are also free to adopt greater protections for gun 
rights,
114
 to set more stringent limits on agency decision-making,
115
 and to ac-
cord less deference to economic regulation
116
 than what U.S. Supreme Court 
 
109. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 211 (emphasis omitted). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 212. 
113. Id. at 176. 
114. Compare Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 2009) (holding that a law prohibiting felons 
from possessing firearms violates the North Carolina Constitution as applied to plaintiff ), 
with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (stating that “nothing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of fire-
arms by felons”). 
115. See SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 177 n.15 (“Many state courts have not 
followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s abandonment of the nondelegation doctrine.”); id. (citing 
examples, including New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New 
York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 N.Y.3d 681, 690-92 (2014), and Texas Boll 
Weevil Eradication Foundation v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 465-475 (Tex. 1997)). 
116. See, e.g., People ex rel. Orcutt v. Instantwhip Denver, Inc., 490 P.2d 940 (Colo. 1971) (invali-
dating the Colorado Filled Milk Act under the state due process clause notwithstanding Su-
preme Court precedent upholding similar legislation under the federal due process clause); 
see id. at 945 (“What is permissible under the Federal Constitution in matters of State eco-
nomic regulation is not necessarily permissible under State law. The Constitution of a State 
may guard more jealously against the exercise of the State’s police power.”) (quoting Cof-
feeRich, Inc. v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 286 (Mass. 1965)); Fair Cadillac-
Oldsmobile Isuzu P’ship v. Bailey, 640 A.2d 101, 107-08 (Conn. 1994) (invalidating Sunday 
closing laws despite Supreme Court precedent upholding such laws); Rogers v. State, 199 
A.2d 895, 897 (Del. 1964) (same); Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 9-
16 (Iowa 2004) (invalidating tax on slot machines on state equal protection grounds after the 
Supreme Court had upheld the tax against federal equal protection challenge); Spartan’s In-
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precedent provides. Judge Sutton also notes that state courts may interpret their 
constitutions to provide less protection than analogous federal provisions, even 




In all these ways, 51 Imperfect Solutions broadens our understanding of the 
role of state courts in our federal system and reduces the polarity that has long 
been associated with state constitutionalism in light of Justice Brennan’s 1977 
article. 
i i .  the making of american  constitutional law 
In addition to foregrounding matters of structure and process instead of lib-
eralism or conservatism in substantive outcomes, Judge Sutton’s treatment of 
judicial federalism answers a deeper concern about state constitutionalism. 
While highlighting the authority of state courts to interpret state constitutions 
independently of the Federal Constitution, Justice Brennan did not explain when 
or on what grounds it is proper for state courts to depart from federal precedent 
 
dus. v. Oklahoma City, 498 P.2d 399, 402 (Okla. 1972) (invalidating Sunday closing laws de-
spite Supreme Court precedent upholding such laws); see also Goodwin Liu, State Constitutions 
and the Protection of Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1320 (2017) (citing 
other examples); Anthony B. Sanders, The “New Judicial Federalism” Before Its Time: A Com-
prehensive Review of Economic Substantive Due Process Under State Constitutional Law Since 1940 
and the Reasons for Its Recent Decline, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 457 (2005) (comprehensively catalogu-
ing these state court decisions). 
117. See SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 66 (discussing State v. Walker, 267 
P.3d 210, 216 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring) (arguing that “there is no exclusionary rule 
under the Utah Constitution” notwithstanding Mapp)); id. at 184 (arguing that state courts 
“should explain the interrelation between the two sets of charters in both directions, whether 
the state guarantee covers more ground or less”).  
In 2011, the Montana Supreme Court upheld a state law restricting corporate independent 
expenditures on behalf of candidates under the U.S. and Montana Constitutions. See W. Tra-
dition P’ship v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 3 (Mont. 2011). Applying strict scrutiny as a matter of 
state and federal law, the state court determined from the record before it that historically 
independent expenditures in Montana did in fact lead to corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption, and it distinguished Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310 (2010), on that ground. See 
W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 6, 8-11, 13. The U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed in a 
five-to-four decision. See Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516 (2012) (per curiam). 
Although the Montana high court’s federal constitutional ruling no longer stands, its judg-
ment that the statute does not run afoul of the state constitution remains valid, and its findings 
on the relationship between independent expenditures and corruption would be relevant in 
the event that the U.S. Supreme Court reconsiders Citizens United. Cf. Bullock, 567 U.S. at 517 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Montana’s experience, like considerable experience elsewhere since 
the Court’s decision in Citizens United, casts grave doubt on the Court’s supposition that in-
dependent expenditures do not corrupt or appear to do so.”). 
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interpreting similarly worded provisions, beyond asserting that state courts may 
depart whenever they do not find U.S. Supreme Court decisions to be “logically 
persuasive and well-reasoned.”
118
 The implication of this view is that state courts 
may simply adopt the dissenting views in federal decisions as a matter of state 
constitutional law. Although some courts have taken this approach,
119
 it has 
drawn criticism for failing to advance “a coherent discourse of state constitu-
tional law—that is, a language in which it is possible for participants in the legal 
system to make intelligible claims about the meaning of state constitutions.”
120
 
Seizing on this concern, Judge Sutton writes: 
While state court judges and advocates assuredly have the authority to 
invoke dissents rather than majority opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in construing their own constitutions, exclusive (or even heavy) reliance 
on debates about the meaning of a federal guarantee is not apt to dignify 
the state constitutions as independent sources of law. Much to the con-
trary. There will never be a healthy “discourse” between state and federal 
judges about the meaning of core guarantees in our American constitu-
tions if the state judges merely take sides on the federal debates and fed-
eral authorities, as opposed to marshaling the distinct state texts and his-
tories and drawing their own conclusions from them.
121
 
He urges state courts to engage in “first-principle inquiries into the meaning of 
the state provisions” and to ask “whether state constitutional law demand[s] a 
different answer from federal constitutional law based on local language, con-
text, and history.”
122
 Many state courts have applied some variant of this ap-
proach, limiting departures from federal precedent to circumstances where the 
 
118. See Brennan, supra note 16, at 498-502. 
119. See, e.g., State v. Goss, 834 A.2d 316, 319 (N.H. 2003) (agreeing with the dissenting views in 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)); City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 
1136-42 (Ohio 2006) (agreeing with the dissenting views in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005)); see also infra text accompanying notes 161-174 (discussing state decisions 
agreeing with the dissenting views in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). 
120. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 764 
(1992); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. 
REV. 271, 271 (1998) (describing Justice Brennan’s article as “avowedly strategic” and observ-
ing that the “renaissance of state constitutional law” he urged has been “rather modest” in its 
contributions). 
121. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 177 (endnote omitted). 
122. Id.; see id. at 17, 178-90. 
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particular text, history, or purpose of a state constitutional provision or the un-
derlying values of the state polity support a state-specific interpretation.
123
 
This approach—what James Gardner has described as “a call to positivism in 
state constitutional law”
124
—is an outgrowth of the notion that law, “far from 
being some body of general principles upon which courts and legislators draw, 
is better understood as the specific commands of specific sovereigns.”
125
 And 
there is certainly a role for a positivist approach to state constitutional adjudica-
tion given the range of topics and directives that such constitutions encompass. 
For example, most state constitutions contain “page after page of laws that 
amount to nothing more than legislation dressed up in constitutional garb.”
126
 
In interpreting such provisions, state courts typically apply the same methods of 
interpretation they apply in statutory construction in order to give effect to the 
lawmakers’ intent. 
In addition, many state constitutions include provisions defining rights and 
government structures that are unique to a particular state. The California Con-
stitution, for example, includes an express right to “privacy” among its enumer-
ation of “inalienable rights.”
127
 This right to privacy was enacted by a 1972 ballot 
initiative. It therefore makes sense that the California Supreme Court has elab-
orated its meaning by looking to the intent of the state electorate (against the 
backdrop of common law and constitutional concepts of privacy) and by crafting 




123. See, e.g., People v. Teresinski, 640 P.2d 753, 760-61 (Cal. 1982); Curious Theatre Co. v. Colo. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, 220 P.3d 544, 551 (Colo. 2009); State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 1225, 
1232-34 (Conn. 1992); People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 157 (Ill. 1984); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 
952, 955-57 (N.J. 1982); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991); State v. 
Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986); see also ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERI-
CAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 146-62 (2009) (collecting examples). 
124. James A. Gardner, The Positivist Revolution That Wasn’t: Constitutional Universalism in the 
States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 109, 128 (1998). 
125. Id. at 121. 
126. Sutton, What Does, supra note 13, at 689. Many such provisions, he notes, are quite “exotic.” 
Id. (citing, among other examples, ALA. CONST. amend. 492, § 1 (promoting the sale of cat-
fish), CAL. CONST. art. X B, § 3-5 (phasing out gill nets for fishing), and IDAHO CONST. art. 
XVI, § 1 (mandating the protection of livestock from “pleuro pneumonia, glanders, splenetic 
or Texas fever”)); see also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21 (“Limiting cruel and inhumane confinement 
of pigs during pregnancy”). 
127. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
128. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808-10 (Cal. 1997) (plurality opinion); 
Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 641-57 (Cal. 1994). 
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 and workers’ rights.
131
 We would expect state courts to 




Moreover, some state constitutional provisions with similar wording as their 
federal counterparts have demonstrably state-specific meanings. Consider, for 
example, whether the constitutional right to a jury trial applies to persons 
charged with petty crimes. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that “[s]o-called 
petty offenses were tried without juries both in England and in the Colonies and 
have always been held to be exempt from the otherwise comprehensive language 
of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial provisions.”
133
 The Maine Supreme Court 
reached a different conclusion under the state constitution’s similarly worded 
guarantee.
134
 The Maine high court cited historical sources and early precedents 
showing that in Massachusetts (of which the District of Maine was a part), “the 
principle that a defendant charged with a criminal violation is entitled to a trial 
by jury encompassed not only the ‘serious’ but also the ‘petty’ violations of the 
criminal law.”
135
 During the colonial and Founding eras, Massachusetts and 
 
129. See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73 (1989); Robert F. Wil-
liams, State Constitutional Religion Clauses: Lessons from the New Judicial Federalism, 7 U. ST. 
THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 192 (2013). 
130. See EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 146-96 (2013); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Con-
stitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 
64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 160 (2003) (“[M]ore than a third of all state constitutions now contain 
environmental policy provisions.”). 
131. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 24 (mandating a minimum wage); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17 
(guaranteeing the right to organize and collective bargaining). See generally JOHN J. DINAN, 
THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 188-204 (2006) (discussing the history of 
workers’ rights provisions in state constitutions). 
132. See, e.g., Tarr, supra note 129, at 94-95 (noting that many state religion clauses “reflect their 
origin in specific disputes about the relationship between church and state” and “have char-
acteristically been phrased in language aimed at the specific evils which brought them forth,” 
using terms “considerably more concrete and more specific than that found in the federal doc-
ument”). 
133. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968). 
134. State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974). Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed . . . .”), with ME. 
CONST. art. I, § 6 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right . . . [t]o have a 
speedy, public and impartial trial, and, except in trials by martial law or impeachment, by a 
jury of the vicinity.”). 
135. Sklar, 317 A.2d at 167. 
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Maine “uniquely deviated from prevalent conceptions of the reach of the princi-
ple of trial by jury in criminal cases.”
136
 Further, the court explained, specific 
features of the Maine Constitution’s drafting history show that the state jury trial 
right, which applies to “all criminal prosecutions,”
137
 “means precisely what it 
says—‘all’—without qualification, restriction, or limitation of any kind” except 
for those expressly stated in the Maine Constitution.
138
 
Another example is the Connecticut Supreme Court’s recent holding that the 
death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the state constitu-
tion’s due process provisions.
139
 The court relied extensively on “Connecticut’s 
unique historical and legal landscape,”
140
 observing that the state’s citizenry and 
leaders adhered to a tradition of leniency and moderation during the colonial 
era
141
 and “witnessed a pronounced liberalization in public, legislative, and ju-
dicial attitudes toward crime and punishment” during the period leading up to 
adoption of the Connecticut Constitution in 1818.
142
 In addition, the court dis-
cussed legislative developments and contemporary practice, noting that “Con-
necticut has imposed sustained death sentences at a rate (taken as a percentage 
of capital eligible convictions) that is among the lowest in the nation” since 1973 
and that “Connecticut has put only one offender to death over the past fifty-five 
years, and that was a serial killer who believed that he deserved to die and vol-
untarily waived his right to further appeals and habeas remedies.”
143
 “[T]he 
sheer rarity with which death sentences are imposed and carried out in Connect-
icut . . . suggests that any conceivable deterrent value will be far less than in a 
state like Texas, for example, which carries out executions on a regular basis.”
144
 
Although the court also discussed national trends as well as general arguments 
 
136. Id. 
137. ME. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
138. Sklar, 317 A.2d at 169. 
139. State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2015); see also CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-9 (due process 
clauses of the Connecticut Constitution); Santiago, 122 A.3d at 14 (“Although neither provi-
sion of the state constitution expressly references cruel or unusual punishments, it is settled 
constitutional doctrine that both of our due process clauses prohibit governmental infliction 
of cruel and unusual punishments.”). 
140. Santiago, 122 A.3d at 10. 
141. Id. at 20-24. 
142. Id. at 24. 
143. Id. at 49. The Santiago case arose after the state legislature had prospectively repealed the death 
penalty, a “compromise” measure that was nonetheless “motivated in no small part by a prin-
cipled belief that state sanctioned executions are no longer a necessary or appropriate form of 
punishment, even for the most heinous crimes.” Id. at 48. 
144. Id. at 60. 




 state-specific considerations permeate the court’s analysis 
and inform its conclusion that “Connecticut’s capital punishment scheme no 
longer comports with our state’s contemporary standards of decency.”
146
 
As these examples confirm, Judge Sutton is correct to insist that state courts 
look to state-specific considerations in independently interpreting provisions of 
their state constitutions. To the extent that a state constitutional provision has 
particular textual or historical features that distinguish it from its federal coun-
terpart, judicial interpretation can and must reflect those state-specific features. 
However, despite his call for a more robust discourse based on distinct state 
texts and histories, the four historical narratives at the core of Judge Sutton’s 
book do not suggest that the importance or legitimacy of state constitutionalism 
depends on such state-centric discourse. To the contrary, each narrative depicts 
state and federal courts grappling with similar constitutional language or con-
cepts, with state courts having influence beyond their jurisdictions precisely be-
cause their decisions are not readily cabined or distinguished on state-specific 
grounds. This is unsurprising given that 
the development of state constitutions since the Founding Era has often 
reflected an amalgam of influences rather than legal traditions or values 
specific to each state. Drafters of state constitutions have made regular 
recourse to other states’ constitutions and to the Federal Constitution; in 
turn, the Framers of the Federal Constitution borrowed heavily from 
state constitutional text and experience. Although state constitutions 
vary in their language and content, the recurring cross-pollination of 
constitutional concepts indicates that state constitutions are both sources 
and products of a shared American legal tradition.
147
 
When state-specific sources do not yield helpful guidance on a constitutional 
question—and this will often be the case
148
—state courts properly look to other 
 
145. See id. at 50-54, 61-71. 
146. Id. at 55. Although the court mentioned in passing that “we have no reason to believe that the 
[E]ighth [A]mendment would compel a different result,” id. at 14 n.11, this unanalyzed asser-
tion does not contend with the many ways in which the opinion’s state-specific reasoning 
could be distinguished in analysis under federal law. 
147. Liu, supra note 116, at 1321-22 (footnotes omitted). For further elaboration of historical and 
conceptual reasons why state constitutional interpretation often lacks state-specific reasoning, 
see Gardner, supra note 124; Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutional-
ism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993); and Liu, supra note 116, at 1322-28. 
148. See Gardner, supra note 120, at 765 (suggesting that research into a state constitutional provi-
sion often yields no insight into “the history of the state constitution”; “the identity of the 
founders, their purposes in creating the constitution, or the specific events that may have 
shaped their thinking”; “the character or fundamental values of the people of the state”; or 
why “certain things are more important to the people than others”). 
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sources, including federal and state decisions interpreting similar language in 
the Federal Constitution or other state constitutions. The sine qua non of inde-
pendence in state constitutional interpretation is not reliance on state-specific 
reasoning; it is analytical independence, as opposed to a posture of deference, in 
evaluating whatever materials are brought to bear on a particular issue. A state 
court should give respectful consideration to federal precedent as well as deci-
sions of other state courts, but it must decide for itself what approach is most 
persuasive and worthy of adoption as a matter of state constitutional law. Im-
portantly, as Judge Sutton’s stories show, it is primarily in areas where constitu-
tional provisions do not have state-specific meanings that we see a rich dialogue 
between and among state and federal courts. 
Consider the exclusionary rule. Two of the leading state cases that Judge Sut-
ton discusses are instructive. In Defore, the issue of whether to admit illegally 
obtained evidence arose under a New York statute prohibiting unreasonable 
searches and seizures;
149
 no such provision appeared in the New York Constitu-
tion until 1938.
150
 Judge Cardozo’s opinion for the New York Court of Appeals 
cited an earlier decision of that court rejecting a rule of exclusion,
151
 observed 
that the statute’s text “says nothing about consequences” of a violation,
152
 and 
deemed the state legislature to have “acquiesced” in the earlier ruling.
153
 Along 
the way, the opinion canvassed constitutional decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court and other state courts, and ultimately agreed with the then-majority view 
that other remedies for police misconduct were sufficient without adding a rule 
that would allow some criminals “to go free because the constable has blun-
dered.”
154
 In Cahan, Justice Traynor’s opinion for the California Supreme Court 
also canvassed state and federal authorities as well as the views of leading schol-
ars, discussed the competing principles and practical consequences, and ulti-
mately concluded that the applicable state and federal constitutional provisions 
“contemplate that it is preferable that some criminals go free than that the right 




149. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 588 (N.Y. 1926) (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 8). 
150. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 (adopted Nov. 8, 1938). The text includes language identical to the 
Fourth Amendment as well as a separate provision ensuring “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications.” Id. 
151. See Defore, 150 N.E. at 587 (citing People v. Adams, 68 N.E. 636 (N.Y. 1903), aff’d, Adams v. 
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904)). 
152. Id. at 588. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 587; see id. at 587-88. 
155. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 914 (Cal. 1955); see id. at 907-14. 
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Neither Defore nor Cahan relied on any concepts of privacy, evidence, or 
search and seizure unique to New York or California. That is unsurprising, since 
there does not appear to be any textual or historical basis for giving a state-spe-
cific interpretation to the search and seizure provision in either the New York 
statute
156
 or the California Constitution.
157
 If any state-specific considerations 
were available, surely the likes of Judge Cardozo and Justice Traynor would have 
discovered them. Both opinions instead relied on general, common-law-like rea-
soning about the prevailing weight of authority, the practical consequences of 
adopting one rule or another, and the ultimate balance to be struck between pri-
vacy and law enforcement. And it is precisely because these cases did not employ 
state-specific reasoning that the U.S. Supreme Court cited Defore as “[w]eighty 
testimony” against the exclusionary rule in Wolf
158
 and then later cited Cahan in 
declaring “[t]he obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment to the pro-
tection of other remedies” in Mapp.
159
 The competing assertions in Defore and 
Cahan as to the efficacy of other remedies may have reflected the experiences of 
those states. But the reasoning of those cases was not bottomed on distinct state 
texts or histories—and that is why the state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court 




Similarly, almost all of the state constitutional decisions that have rejected 
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule have employed general, not 
state-specific, reasoning.
161
 These decisions rely on scholarly criticism of the Su-
 
156. See Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State 
Court of Appeals’ Quest for Principled Decisionmaking, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 42-55 (1996) (re-
viewing history of the New York statute and its interpretation in Defore); Matthew M. Weiss-
man, People v. Torres and the Limits of State Constitutionalism: Has the Court of Appeals Forgotten 
the Cop?, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 299, 338-40, 341 n.185 (1991) (same). 
157. California’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, first adopted in the original 
state constitution of 1849, is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment. Compare CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 13, and CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 19, with U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
158. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949); see id. at 31 n.2 (specifically quoting a passage from 
Defore that employs general, not state-specific, reasoning). 
159. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961). 
160. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 82. 
161. See State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 62-68 (Conn. 1990); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 672-
77 (Idaho 1992); State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 288-93 (Iowa 2000); State v. Canelo, 653 
A.2d 1097, 1103-05 (N.H. 1995); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 853-57 (N.J. 1987); State 
v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067-68 (N.M. 1993); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457-58 
(N.Y. 1985); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 556-62 (N.C. 1988); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 
121-27 (Vt. 1991); State v. Sanchez, 875 P.2d 712, 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). An exception is 
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he his-
tory of [the Pennsylvania Constitution’s search and seizure provision] . . . indicates that the 
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preme Court’s decision in United States v. Leon,
162
 Justice Brennan’s dissent in 
Leon,
163
 strict understandings of the probable cause or warrant requirement, or 
the state court’s own judgment as to the costs and benefits of excluding evidence 
unlawfully obtained by the police acting in good faith. In discussing one of these 
decisions, State v. Guzman,
164
 Judge Sutton laments that the Idaho Supreme 
Court did not “explain its rejection of a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule based on reasons specific to Idaho’s Constitution or even to its sister 
States.”
165
 But it is not apparent what Idaho-specific reasons the court could have 
given. The prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures in the Idaho Con-
stitution mirrors the Fourth Amendment, except that it says no warrant shall 
issue without probable cause “shown by affidavit”
166
 instead of “supported by 
Oath or affirmation.”
167
 And the enactment history does not indicate anything 
distinctive about the state provision’s meaning.
168
 
Where no state-specific considerations are apparent, it is not clear what 
Judge Sutton would have state courts do. I doubt he would argue they should 
simply follow federal precedent.
169
 The Idaho high court in Guzman (like other 
courts in this line of cases) did exactly what it should have done: it gave respect-
ful consideration to Leon but undertook its own independent analysis of the 
good-faith exception. After examining its own case law, the court disagreed with 
“the basic premise of the Leon decision—that the decision whether to apply the 
 
purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Commonwealth is quite distinct from the 
purpose underlying the exclusionary rule under the 4th Amendment” insofar as the state pro-
vision “demonstrates . . . the paramount concern for privacy.” 586 A.2d 887, 897 (Pa. 1991) 
(citation omitted). In addition, three state high courts have rejected the good-faith exception 
principally on state statutory grounds. See Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242, 254-55 (Del. 1987); 
Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 430 (Ga. 1992); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 551-
52 (Mass. 1985). 
162. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (adopting good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule). 
163. Id. at 928 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
164. 842 P.2d at 660. 
165. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 65. 
166. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. 
167. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
168. See 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IDAHO, 1889, 
at 1635-36 (I.W. Hart ed., 1912) (indicating that the constitutional convention adopted the 
search and seizure language without any substantive discussion); see also DONALD CROWLEY 
& FLORENCE HEFFRON, THE IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 57-59 (1994). 
169. See SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 20 (“For too long, we have lived in a 
top-down constitutional world, in which the U.S. Supreme Court announces a ruling, and 
the state supreme courts move in lockstep in construing the counterpart guarantees of their 
own constitutions.”). 
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exclusionary rule should be made by determining whether the goal of police de-
terrence would be furthered in the case at bar.”
170
 That approach, the court as-
serted, “totally fails to take into account the other purposes of our independent 
state exclusionary rule,” namely, preserving judicial integrity and deterring the 
issuance of invalid warrants.
171
 The court also “reject[ed] the Leon Court’s cost-
benefit analysis of the exclusionary rule.”
172
 Such analysis contains all the hall-
marks of independent decision-making; it is not clear why the absence of state-
specific reasoning should mean that the decision “does not amplify the inde-
pendent nature of a state constitutional guarantee.”
173
 Judge Sutton acknowl-
edges that decisions like Guzman exemplify how “constitutional law can be, and 
should be, interactive between the States and the national government.”
174
 I 
would emphasize that it is because decisions like Guzman have not relied on state-
specific reasoning that state courts have been in active dialog with each other and 
with the U.S. Supreme Court in this area. 
The same point is implicit in Judge Sutton’s chapter on compulsory sterili-
zation laws. The pre-Buck v. Bell state decisions invalidating such laws relied on 
two main theories: first, the lack of basic protections to ensure that a measure as 
drastic as involuntary sterilization was imposed only after an “individual specific, 
record supported, and thorough” selection process; and second, the “means-end 
disconnect” of laws that “turned on the risk that the ‘feebleminded’ would re-
produce but applied only to those least able to procreate: institutionalized indi-
viduals.”
175
 Almost all of the decisions applied these due process and equal pro-
tection concepts as a matter of federal constitutional law;
176
 one applied state 
 
170. State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 672 (Idaho 1992). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 673; see also id. at 673-77 (citing, among other things, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Leon, 
scholarly commentary, and other state high court decisions rejecting the good-faith excep-
tion). 
173. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 65. The state courts that have rejected 
Leon plainly do not subscribe to the proposition that “[s]imply disagreeing with the United 
States Supreme Court about the meaning of the same or similar constitutional provisions . . . 
risks undermining confidence in the judicial process and the objective interpretation of con-
stitutional and legislative enactments.” Curious Theatre Co. v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & 
Env’t, 220 P.3d 544, 551 (Colo. 2009). 
174. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 67. 
175. Id. at 130, 131; see also id. at 92-108 (discussing these state decisions). 
176. See Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2, 2 (Ind. 1921) (invalidating the statute under federal due 
process principles); Smith v. Command, 204 N.W. 140, 143-44 (Mich. 1925) (invalidating part 
of the statute under federal equal protection principles and rejecting a federal due process 
challenge to the statute); Haynes v. Lapeer, 166 N.W. 938, 940 (Mich. 1918) (invalidating the 
statute under federal equal protection principles, as indicated by its citation to 6 RULING CASE 
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and federal equal protection guarantees without differentiating between the 
two.
177
 If the state courts had instead relied on constitutional texts, histories, or 
concepts unique to their jurisdictions, there would be less support for Judge Sut-
ton’s criticism that Justice Holmes in Buck “never mentioned the considerable 
state court authority in support of Buck.”
178
 And Judge Sutton’s observation that 
“the state courts for the most part refused to take seriously arguments under 
their own constitutions after Buck”
179
 is fairly read as criticism of those courts 
not for failing to identify state-specific grounds for invalidating compulsory ster-
ilization laws, but rather for failing to exercise their independent authority to 
squarely reject Buck’s flawed reasoning as a matter of state law.
180
 
The state decisions concerning mandatory flag salutes likewise do not con-
tain much in the way of state-specific reasoning. Although the religious-freedom 
clauses of many state constitutions are more detailed than the First Amendment, 
the principal issue in the flag-salute cases was whether courts would give cre-
dence to the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ belief that their religion forbade them from 
participating in the salute. As Judge Sutton notes, the courts that rejected the 
Witnesses’ claims characterized the salute as having nothing to do with religion 




LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 373 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1915)); 
Smith v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963, 966-67 (N.J. 1913) (invalidating the 
statute under federal equal protection principles); Osborn v. Thomson, 169 N.Y.S. 638, 642-
44 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. 1918) (invalidating the statute under federal equal protection prin-
ciples), aff’d, 185 A.D. 902 (N.Y. App. Div. 1918) (no opinion). 
177. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 104-05 & n.170 (discussing Cline v. State 
Bd. of Eugenics, No. 15-422 (Or. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1921) (invalidating one statute under state 
and federal equal protection principles, and invalidating another statute under federal due 
process principles)). 
178. Id. at 115. 
179. Id. at 130. 
180. Judge Sutton suggests that state courts could have relied on state constitutional prohibitions 
on “class legislation.” Id. at 131 (citing Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, 
and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 252 (1997)). But it is not clear how such provisions 
would have served as anything more than alternative vessels for adopting equal protection 
reasoning contrary to Buck’s conclusions. Melissa Saunders contends that the Federal Equal 
Protection Clause was originally “understood and intended . . . to nationalize the developing 
state constitutional doctrine against partial or special laws.” Saunders, supra, at 249. On this 
view, if compulsory sterilization laws violated those state prohibitions, then the laws also vi-
olated the federal equal protection guarantee. The application of state prohibitions on “class 
legislation” to invalidate such laws would not have been a means of distinguishing Buck on 
state-specific grounds; it would have essentially been another way of saying that Buck was 
wrongly decided. 
181. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 169; see id. at 153-55 (discussing State ex 
rel. Bleich v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 190 So. 815, 816 (Fla. 1939); Leoles v. Landers, 192 S.E. 
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courts that granted relief were those that “took the Witnesses at their word.”
182
 
Nothing in this reasoning, in either direction, turned on state-specific consider-
ations. Indeed, one of the post-Gobitis state constitutional decisions that Judge 
Sutton lauds expressly relied on federal authorities,
183
 and another appealed di-
rectly to national, not state, values.
184
 These cases again illustrate that state-cen-
tric reasoning is not necessary “to dignify the state constitutions as independent 
sources of law”
185
 and that it is on issues not susceptible to such reasoning that 
state and federal courts are (or should be) jointly engaged as expositors of Amer-
ican constitutionalism. 
The one area among Judge Sutton’s four narratives that would seem most 
likely to include distinct state analyses is school funding. Unlike the Federal Con-
stitution, almost every state constitution has explicit language requiring the pro-
vision of free public schooling,
186
 and school-finance litigation in state courts 
over the past forty years has produced a wide variety of outcomes. But one would 
be hard pressed to correlate the variation in outcomes with variation in the text 
or history of state constitutional provisions. Differences in outcomes have had 
less to do with the “specific wording of a state constitution”
 
and “more to do with 




218, 222 (Ga. 1937); Nicholls v. Mayor & Sch. Comm. of Lynn, 7 N.E.2d 577, 579-80 (Mass. 
1937); Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 189 A. 629, 629 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1937)). 
182. Id. at 162; see id. at 155-59 (discussing People ex rel. Fish v. Sandstrom, 18 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 
1939)); id. at 160-67 (discussing Zavilla v. Masse, 147 P.2d 823, 826 (Colo. 1944); State v. 
Smith, 127 P.2d 518, 523 (Kan. 1942); Bolling v. Superior Court, 133 P.2d 803, 809 (Wash. 
1943); State v. Mercante (W. Va. Cir. Ct. June 1, 1942) (on file with author)). 
183. Bolling, 133 P.2d at 808-09 (quoting extensively from Chief Justice Stone’s dissent in Gobitis 
and from the three-judge district court decision in Barnette). 
184. Mercante, slip op. at 6 (“The moment any court takes to itself the right to hold a religious view 
unreasonable, that moment the American courts begin to deny the right of religious free-
dom.”); id. at 13 (“[W]hat this court is asked to do is to force children . . . to do something 
against the consciences of both themselves and their parents. This has not been done in Amer-
ica hitherto; we shall not begin it here.”). 
185. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 177. 
186. See Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic 
Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814-16, 814 n.138, 815 nn.143-44 (1985) (providing comprehensive 
citations to these state provisions and grouping them into four categories based on content 
and prescriptiveness). 
187. Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisal, in SCHOOL 
MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 1, 9 (Martin R. West & Paul 
E. Peterson eds., 2007). 
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ferent perceptions of the role properly played by the courts in overseeing com-
pliance with the state’s basic charter.”
188
 
For example, some state courts have found their state education clauses to be 
purely aspirational or too vaguely worded to support a justiciable adequacy 
claim,
189
 while other state courts have reached contrary conclusions about simi-
larly vague provisions.
190
 Although some of these decisions examine the enact-
ment history of the constitutional provisions, what is most often dispositive is 
each court’s understanding of separation of powers and the judicial role, in-
formed by the behavior of other courts.
191
 In addition, judicial definitions of ed-
ucational adequacy have relied more on practical inquiry into the skills needed 
 
188. Campaign for Quality Educ. v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 888, 906 (Ct. App. 2016) (Pollak, J., 
dissenting). 
189. See, e.g., id. at 896-99 (construing CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge 
and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, 
the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, 
moral, and agricultural improvement.”); and CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5 (“The Legislature shall 
provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported 
in each district at least six months in every year . . . .”)); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 
672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189-93 (Ill. 1996) (construing ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (“The State shall pro-
vide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services.”)); 
Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 488-89 (Mo. 2009) (construing MO. 
CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to 
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general assembly shall establish 
and maintain free public schools . . . .”)). 
190. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 309-10 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam) (construing KAN. 
CONST. art. VI, § 6(b) (“The legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the edu-
cational interests of the state.”)); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205-13 
(Ky. 1989) (construing KY. CONST. § 183 (“The General Assembly shall, by appropriate leg-
islation, provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.”)); Abbott 
v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 367-68 (N.J. 1990) (construing N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1 (“The 
Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system 
of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of 
five and eighteen years.”)); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 665-68 
(N.Y. 1995) (construing N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the 
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this 
state may be educated.”)). 
191. Compare, e.g., Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1191 (“The constitution provides no principled basis for a 
judicial definition of high quality . . . . Nor is education a subject within the judiciary’s field 
of expertise . . . . Rather, the question of educational quality is inherently one of policy . . . .”), 
and Comm. for Educ. Equal., 294 S.W.3d at 489 (“The aspiration for a ‘general diffusion of 
knowledge and intelligence’ concerns policy decisions, and these political choices are left to 
the discretion of the other branches of government.” (quoting MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a))), 
with Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 930 (Kan. 2005) (per curiam) (“Although the balance of 
power may be delicate, ever since Marbury v. Madison, it has been settled that the judiciary’s 
sworn duty includes judicial review of legislation for constitutional infirmity. We are not at 
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for effective civic and economic participation than on close parsing of specific 
constitutional texts.
192
 And courts have stated such definitions in generally ap-
plicable terms; they do not purport to set standards for New York children as 
New Yorkers or for Kentucky children as Kentuckians. Thus, even in an area where 
state constitutions plainly differ from each other and from the Federal Constitu-
tion, we observe state courts speaking a common language of constitutional con-
cepts in a mutually informative dialogue across jurisdictions. 
In sum, Judge Sutton’s four narratives illuminate that state constitutionalism 
does not ultimately derive its legitimacy or independence from a state-centric 
approach to interpretation. Although state constitutionalism may benefit from 
“first-principle inquiries” into “local language, context, and history,”
193
 51 Im-
perfect Solutions actually drives home a different thesis: our system of judicial 
federalism contemplates redundancy in interpretive authority, and the justifica-
tion for that redundancy fundamentally lies in considerations of constitutional 
structure, not interpretive methodology. 
In the end, these structural considerations are Judge Sutton’s main themes. 
First, redundancy serves as a safeguard due to the simple fact that two independ-
ent layers of judicial review are better than one.
194
 In the face of an ill-reasoned 
U.S. Supreme Court decision, redundant interpretive authority at the state level 
can “prevent[] matters from being worse” and eventually cause the U.S. Su-
preme Court to rethink its precedent.
195
 
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court and state high courts are differently posi-
tioned when it comes to constitutional adjudication. “In some settings, the chal-
lenge of imposing a constitutional solution on the whole country at once will 
increase the likelihood that federal constitutional law will be underenforced, that 
a ‘federalism discount’ will be applied to the right. State courts face no such 
 
liberty to abdicate our own constitutional duty.” (citation omitted)), and Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 
209 (“The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to apply, interpret, define, construe 
all words, phrases, sentences and sections of the Kentucky Constitution . . . . This duty must 
be exercised even when such action serves as a check on the activities of another branch of 
government . . . .”). 
192. See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212 (enumerating seven capacities that an efficient system of 
education must provide to every child); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 801 N.E.2d at 330-32 (de-
fining “sound basic education” in terms of skills needed for civic and economic participation 
in contemporary society); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979) (enumerating 
eight capacities that a thorough and efficient school system must provide to every child). 
193. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 177. 
194. See id. at 170. 
195. Id. at 128-29; see Liu, supra note 116, at 1332 (discussing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) as examples 
of cases where the Court cited state constitutional decisions in overruling its own precedents). 
state courts and constitutional structure 
1339 
problem in construing their own constitutions.”
196
 Also, state constitutional de-




Third, innovation by state courts can inform federal constitutional adjudica-
tion, allowing the U.S. Supreme Court to assess what has worked and what has 
not.
198
 The notion of states as laboratories suggests that “whenever the Court 
confronts a federal constitutional problem with a state analogue, it might use-
fully learn from the experience of the state courts that got there first.”
199
 
Fourth, some constitutional issues are inherently complex and, as a practical 
matter, might be best resolved on a state-by-state basis rather than through one-
size-fits-all adjudication for the entire nation.
200
 
Fifth, deciding a federal constitutional issue against the backdrop of conver-
gent state decisions can lessen “the assumption of power that invariably occurs 
when the [U.S. Supreme] Court nationalizes a right,” especially in areas where 




Finally, interpretive redundancy can help “ease the pressure on the U.S. Su-
preme Court to be the key rights innovator in modern America” by situating 
accountability for individual-rights protection in multiple forums.
202
 The avail-
ability of multiple forums for litigating and resolving similar constitutional is-
sues comports with the Framers’ understanding that “a large and diverse nation 
committed to liberty will not often agree on one right answer to questions of 
intense public controversy. The redundancies built into our structure of govern-
 
196. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 17; see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
30-31 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that federal courts’ “reluctan[ce] to intrude 
too deeply into areas traditionally regulated by the States . . . . does not touch or concern state 
courts interpreting state law”); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Un-
derenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1217-18 (1978). 
197. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 18, 213. 
198. Id. at 68-69, 178, 207. 
199. Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 343 
(2011); see id. (“In other words, state courts need not be independent laboratories. They can 
be part of the same general research institution as the Supreme Court.”); see also New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“There must be power 
in the states and the nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and 
institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.”). 
200. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 40, 208. 
201. Id. at 69; see also Blocher, supra note 199, at 366. 
202. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 214; see id. at 37, 188-89. 
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None of these features of our constitutional structure depends on the invig-
oration of state-centric discourse as the hallmark of independent state constitu-
tionalism. Indeed, interactive dialogue among state courts and between state and 
federal courts could not get far off the ground if state constitutional decisions 
were siloed by the idiosyncrasies of particular state texts, histories, or values. The 
commonality of the interpretive task facing state and federal courts is nicely cap-
tured by the title of Judge Sutton’s book: it does not speak of distinctively federal 




i i i .  state courts and school segregation 
51 Imperfect Solutions aims to dislodge the conventional wisdom that “only 
life-tenured federal judges, not elected state court judges, only the national gov-
ernment, not the States, can be trusted to enforce constitutional rights.”
205
 Al-
though the four narratives in the book further this objective, Judge Sutton offers 
this caveat: 
Ever since Brown v. Board of Education, a recurring theme in federal con-
stitutional law has been that the States and their constituent parts—leg-
islatures, governors, courts, local governments—have been the policy vil-
lains in this or that area of law and this or that era of history. The States, 
to their discredit, often supplied ample evidence to support these stories, 





203. Liu, supra note 116, at 1335 (footnote omitted). This is not to minimize the role of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in issuing definitive rulings on controversial issues, as it did in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), for example. But it does “underscore the delicacy of the Supreme Court’s role 
in adjudicating individual rights claims.” Liu, supra note 116, at 1336. 
204. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at tit. (emphasis added); see id. at 196 (not-
ing that nineteenth- and early twentieth-century treatises on constitutional law covered both 
state and federal law, and asking, “Why not offer a course on American constitutional law, one 
that covers all facets of the topic?”); see also Kahn, supra note 147, at 1148 (“The common object 
of state interpretive efforts is American constitutionalism.”). 
205. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 203. 
206. Id. at viii. 
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This is certainly consistent with how I was taught constitutional law: the history 
of segregation cast the states in such a poor light and, because of Brown, vested 
the U.S. Supreme Court with such moral authority that the notion of state courts 
as protectors of individual rights was relegated to an afterthought, if considered 
at all. Although Judge Sutton does not squarely confront this history,
207
 I suspect 
many readers will insist on some reckoning with it before accepting his call to 
“return[] the States to the front lines of rights protection.”
208
 
For decades, Brown has stood as the U.S. Supreme Court’s most honored 
decision—”th[e] Court’s finest hour.”
209
 But the road to Brown is more compli-
cated than the usual telling. One clue is in the caption of Brown itself.
210
 Brown 
involved four consolidated cases. Three of them—from Kansas, South Carolina, 
and Virginia—came to the Supreme Court from federal district courts that had 
upheld segregated schooling, while one case—from Delaware—came from a 
state high court that had ordered the admission of black students to white 
schools.
211
 When the Court issued its disposition in Brown, it reversed the three 
federal district courts and affirmed the one state high court.
212
 
This bit of history invites more thorough consideration of the role of state 
courts in addressing school segregation. What emerges is another story of inter-
action between state and federal courts in the making of American constitutional 
law, one in which the state courts had a greater role in the struggle for racial 
equality than is commonly acknowledged. If Judge Sutton’s book had included 
a narrative on school segregation, here is what it might have said. 
A. Separate but Equal 
In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson established the separate-but-equal principle that 
gave legal sanction to Jim Crow.
213
 But the Supreme Court in Plessy did not write 
 
207. Judge Sutton observes that “[e]ven the most acclaimed individual rights decision in American 
history, Brown v. Board of Education, is more complicated than it might at first appear when it 
comes to the role of the States and national government in rights protection.” Id. at 204. But 
he does not develop this point beyond citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), to note 
that school segregation was practiced not only by the states but also by the federal govern-
ment. 
208. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS, supra note 13, at 213. 
209. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 867 (2007) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
210. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 & n.* (1954). 
211. Id. at 487-88 & n.1. 
212. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
213. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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on a blank slate. One of the key authorities it relied on was Roberts v. City of Bos-
ton, an 1849 decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upholding 
separate schools for white and colored children under the state constitution.
214
 
The plaintiff in the Massachusetts case, five-year-old Sarah Roberts, was 
represented by Charles Sumner, who became a U.S. Senator and vigorous cham-
pion of emancipation and equal rights for freedmen. The school committee of 
Boston had denied Roberts admission to the primary school nearest her resi-
dence and had assigned her to a school exclusively for colored children.
215
 This 
segregation, Sumner argued, “is a source of practical inconvenience to [colored 
children] and their parents, to which white persons are not exposed, and is, 
therefore, a violation of equality.”
216
 He further argued that “[t]he separation of 
children in the public schools of Boston, on account of color or race, is in the 
nature of caste, and is a violation of equality.”
217
 Sumner brought these claims 
under two provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, one declaring that 




The Roberts decision was written by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, one of the 
most able and prolific jurists of the nineteenth century.
219
 In a passage that Plessy 
later quoted, Chief Justice Shaw wrote: 
The great principle, advanced by the learned and eloquent advocate for 
the plaintiff, is, that by the constitution and laws of Massachusetts, all 
persons without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin or condi-
tion, are equal before the law. This, as a broad general principle, such as 
ought to appear in a declaration of rights, is perfectly sound; it is not only 
expressed in terms, but pervades and animates the whole spirit of our 
constitution of free government. But, when this great principle comes to 
be applied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it 
will not warrant the assertion, that men and women are legally clothed 
with the same civil and political powers, and that children and adults are 
legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment; 
but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are 
 
214. Id. at 544-45 (quoting Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849)). 
215. Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 200-01. 
216. Id. at 202. 
217. Id. 
218. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I; id. pt. 1, art. VI; see Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 201. 
219. See generally FREDERIC HATHAWAY CHASE, LEMUEL SHAW: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME JU-
DICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS 1830-1860 (1918). 
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equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law, 
for their maintenance and security.
220
 
As required by the state constitution, the Massachusetts legislature had cre-
ated school districts and had vested “plenary authority” in elected committees to 
“arrange, classify, and distribute pupils” in the manner the committee thought 
“best adapted to [students’] general proficiency and welfare.”
221
 Just as the com-
mittee might group students by age or socioeconomic status, so too it might de-
cide to separate students by race.
222
 The plaintiff still “had access to a school” 
that was as “well conducted” and “well fitted” for education “as the other pri-
mary schools.”
223
 The court thus saw no basis for second-guessing the commit-
tee’s “honest” determination based on “experience and judgment” that main-
taining segregated schools would serve “the good of both classes of schools.”
224
 
As for Sumner’s contention that school segregation “tends to deepen and 
perpetuate the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted prejudice in 
public opinion,” Chief Justice Shaw replied that “[t]his prejudice, if it exists, is 
not created by law, and probably cannot be changed by law.”
225
 Whether such 
prejudice would be lessened by admitting white and colored children to the same 
schools “may well be doubted,” he said, and in any event, this was a question for 
the school committee to decide based on “reason,” “experience,” and “honest 
judgment.”
226
 Roberts thus upheld the doctrine of separate but equal in public 
education. 
The Roberts decision proved influential due to the prestige of the opinion’s 
author, the stature of the plaintiff’s lawyer, and the fact that the court belonged 
to a state “where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and 
most earnestly enforced.”
227
 The decision was cited by the high courts of Ne-
vada, California, New York, and Missouri in opinions upholding segregated 




220. Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 206; see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (quoting 
Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 206). 
221. Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 207-08. 
222. Id. at 208. 
223. Id. at 205. 
224. Id. at 209. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 209-10. 
227. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
228. See Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 52-56 (1874) (quoting Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 205-10); 
Lehew v. Brummell, 15 S.W. 765, 767 (Mo. 1891) (citing Roberts); State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. 
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opinions, along with decisions from Ohio and Indiana,
229
 comprised a jurispru-
dential echo chamber, as the state courts repeatedly cited each other. 
In Bertonneau v. Board of Directors, the first published federal decision up-
holding segregated schools under the Fourteenth Amendment, the principal au-
thorities on which the court relied were the decisions of the Ohio and Nevada 
high courts.
230
 The opinion, authored by then-Judge (and later U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice) William Woods, echoed Chief Justice Shaw’s reasoning in Roberts 
by analogizing racial segregation to gender or age classifications and explaining: 
“Any classification which preserves substantially equal school advantages does 
not impair any rights, and is not prohibited by the constitution of the United 
States. Equality of rights does not necessarily imply identity of rights.”
231
 
These state court decisions, along with Bertonneau, formed the nucleus of 
authorities on which Plessy relied.
232
 In addition to citing Roberts, the Court in 
Plessy—in its infamous passage declaring that the law does not and cannot play 
any role in perpetuating or overcoming racial prejudice—quoted the New York 
Court of Appeals’ assertion that social intercourse between blacks and whites 
can neither be accomplished nor promoted by laws which conflict with 
the general sentiment of the community upon whom they are designed 
to operate. When the government, therefore, has secured to each of its 
citizens equal rights before the law and equal opportunities for improve-
ment and progress, it has accomplished the end for which it was orga-
nized and performed all of the functions respecting social advantages 
with which it is endowed.
233
 
Although Plessy involved segregated railway coaches, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Gong Lum v. Rice had no difficulty applying the separate-but-equal doctrine to 
 
Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 347-48 (1872) (citing Roberts); People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 
453-54 (1883) (quoting Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 206). 
229. See Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874); State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871). 
230. Bertonneau v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Schs., 3 F. Cas. 294, 296 (D. La. 1878) (No. 1361) (citing 
McCann and Duffy). 
231. Id. 
232. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45. 
233. Id. at 551 (quoting Gallagher, 93 N.Y. at 448); see also Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 F. 381, 382 
(N.D. Cal. 1902) (relying on Roberts and other state decisions to hold that segregated school-
ing does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730, 735-37 
(S.D. Ohio 1882) (same). 
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public education in light of Plessy’s reliance on the body of state and federal de-
cisions upholding segregated schools.
234
 
This early case law shows state and federal courts converging on several 
themes: (1) state legislatures are vested by the education clauses in state consti-
tutions with a broad mandate to establish a system of public schools; (2) state 
legislatures or local entities with delegated authority have wide discretion to as-
sign students to schools, including assigning by race; (3) equality under the law 
means equality of material opportunities and does not include what courts then 
called “social equality”; and (4) with respect to any stigma associated with seg-
regated schooling, the law is neither part of the problem nor part of the solu-
tion.
235
 These principles were forged through recurring interactions among state 
courts and between state courts and federal courts. 
B. Pro-integration Voices 
It is not surprising that many state courts, like the federal courts of that era, 
declined to find segregation unlawful. What is perhaps surprising, or at least less 
known, is that a number of state courts granted relief in nineteenth-century cases 
challenging segregated schools. In a comprehensive survey of those cases, histo-
rian J. Morgan Kousser reports that among forty-eight decisions by state high 
courts between 1834 and 1903, black plaintiffs obtained relief in twenty-eight 
 
234. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1927) (citing Plessy, Bertonneau, Roberts, and the 
state high court decisions supra notes 228-229). The decision in Gong Lum, issued six months 
after Buck v. Bell, was authored by Chief Justice Taft on behalf of a unanimous Court that 
included Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis. Cf. supra note 85. The Court had previously 
upheld the constitutionality of a separate and unequal school system in Cumming v. Richmond 
County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899). In that case, a Georgia school district main-
tained a high school for white children but refused to provide one for blacks because of insuf-
ficient funds. The Court reasoned that the district had acted within its discretion in deciding 
how to allocate limited tax revenue and that the decision to operate a high school only for 
whites had not “been made with any desire or purpose on the part of the Board to discriminate 
against any of the colored school children of the county on account of their race.” Id. at 544. 
The issue of segregation was not directly addressed. The Cumming decision was written by 
Justice John Marshall Harlan, the lone dissenter in Plessy, and demonstrated the limits of his 
commitment to racial equality. See Goodwin Liu, The First Justice Harlan, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 
1383, 1385-86, 1390-92 (2008). 
235. Other state decisions in this line include Burnside v. Douglas School District No. 27, 261 P. 629 
(Ariz. 1927); Dameron v. Bayless, 126 P. 273 (Ariz. 1912); Richardson v. Board of Education, 84 P. 
538 (Kan. 1906); Reynolds v. Board of Education, 72 P. 274 (Kan. 1903); and McMillan v. School 
Committee, 12 S.E. 330 (N.C. 1890). 




 By comparison, among ten federal decisions reported during that pe-
riod, black plaintiffs obtained relief in five cases.
237
 Courts granted relief on state 




An early victory for black schoolchildren was the Iowa Supreme Court’s 1868 
decision in Clark v. Board of School Directors.
239
 The court framed the issue of 
segregation not in terms of whether public sentiment was sufficient justification 
for the practice, but in terms of whether state law vested the school board with 
any discretion to segregate by race.
240
 Tracing the history of state enactments on 
the matter, the court discerned “three distinct phases of legislative sentiment”: 
first, the total exclusion of black children from public schools under the original 
Iowa Constitution of 1846 and related statutes; second, an 1858 statute 
“provid[ing] for the education of the colored youths in separate schools,” except 
where “the unanimous consent of the persons sending to the school” allowed 
blacks to attend with whites; and third, statutes enacted in 1860, 1862, and 1866 
providing for “the instruction of youth between the ages of five and twenty-one 
years,” with “no mention of, or discrimination in regard to, color.”
241
 The legis-
lature had enacted the latter statutes pursuant to a new mandate in the 1857 state 
constitution to “provide for the education of all the youths of the State, through a 
system of common schools.”
242
 
Against the backdrop of the prior enactments, the court read the 1857 consti-
tutional provision and implementing statutes to mean “all the youths are equal 
before the law, and there is no discretion vested in the board of directors or else-
where, to interfere with or disturb that equality.”
243
 The court’s use of the phrase 
“equal before the law” provided a direct counterpoint to Chief Justice Shaw’s use 
of the same phrase in Roberts.
244
 The court in Clark broadly declared that the 
school board had no authority under state law to discriminate by race, color, na-
tionality, religion, or economic circumstance.
245
 Such discrimination, the court 
 
236. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, DEAD END: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITIGA-
TION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOLS 61 tbl.5 (1986). 
237. Id. 
238. Id.; see id. at 9. 
239. 24 Iowa 266 (1868). 
240. Id. at 269-70. 
241. Id. at 270-72. 
242. Id. at 271; see id. at 274. 
243. Id. at 277. 
244. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849). 
245. Clark, 24 Iowa at 275-77. 
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said, would violate “the spirit of our laws” and “would tend to perpetuate the 




The following year, the Michigan Supreme Court held in People ex rel. Work-
man v. Board of Education that school segregation in Detroit violated an 1867 state 
statute declaring that “[a]ll residents of any district shall have an equal right to 
attend any school therein.”
247
 The question was whether the statute was in-
tended to apply to Detroit, and the court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Thomas 
Cooley,
248
 explained that the legislature had enacted the law to reach districts 
previously “empowered to make their own regulations” on school attendance.
249
 
Such districts included Detroit, and the statute was intended “to prohibit what 
the legislature evidently regard[ed] as an unjust discrimination.”
250
 Chief Justice 
Cooley was unmoved by the school board’s citation to Roberts for the proposition 
that whether segregation or integration would best serve the interests of children 
of both races is a matter for local authorities to determine.
251
 
The next case in this line was the Kansas Supreme Court’s 1881 decision in 
Board of Education v. Tinnon.
252
 The holding in Tinnon, as in Clark and Workman, 
rested on statutory grounds: local school boards had no authority to assign stu-
dents to schools on the basis of race “unless it appears clear beyond all question 
that the legislature intended to authorize such distinctions to be made.”
253
 The 
court adopted this clear-statement rule upon observing that “[t]he tendency of 
the times is, and has been for several years, to abolish all distinctions on account 
of race, or color, or previous condition of servitude, and to make all persons ab-
solutely equal before the law.”
254
 Implicitly dismissing Roberts as “very old” and 
 
246. Id. at 276. 
247. 18 Mich. 400, 409-10 (1869). 
248. Chief Justice Cooley, a leading jurist of his time, was the author of a widely cited treatise on 
American constitutional law. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN 
UNION (Bos., Little, Brown, & Co. 1868). 
249. Workman, 18 Mich. at 412. 
250. Id. at 412-13. 
251. Id. at 407-08. 
252. 26 Kan. 1 (1881). 
253. Id. at 18. The legislature had provided no such clear authorization to “cities of the second 
class,” including the city of Ottawa, the jurisdiction at issue in Tinnon. See id. at 18-23. Thus, 
Tinnon affirmed the trial court’s judgment ordering the admission of the black plaintiff to a 
white school. Id. at 23. 
254. Id. at 18. 
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“rendered before the war,”
255




Although Tinnon declined to address Fourteenth Amendment issues,
257
 the 
court all but said that no rational basis could support segregated schooling. “No 
good reason” could be given, the court noted, 
for separating two children, living in the same house, equally intelligent, 
and equally advanced in their studies, and sending one, because he or she 
is black, to a school house in a remote part of the city, past several school 
houses nearer his or her home, while the other child is permitted, because 
he or she is white, to go to a school within the distance of a block.
258
 
Further, in contrast to Chief Justice Shaw’s doubts as to whether integration 
would tend to lessen prejudice, the Kansas court offered the following dicta: 
Is it not better for the grand aggregate of human society, as well as for 
individuals, that all children should mingle together and learn to know 
each other? At the common schools, where both sexes and all kinds of 
children mingle together, we have the great world in miniature; there 
they may learn human nature in all its phases, with all its emotions, pas-
sions and feelings, its loves and hates, its hopes and fears, its impulses 
and sensibilities; there they may learn the secret springs of human ac-
tions, and the attractions and repulsions, which lead with irresistible 
force to particular lines of conduct. But on the other hand, persons by 
isolation may become strangers even in their own country; and by being 
strangers, will be of but little benefit either to themselves or to society. 
As a rule, people cannot afford to be ignorant of the society which sur-
rounds them; and as all kinds of people must live together in the same 




One year after Tinnon, the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Longress v. 
Board of Education held that a local segregation policy violated a state statute pro-
hibiting school boards from “excluding” any child from a school “on account of 
 
255. Id. at 23; see id. at 6 (noting the school board’s reliance on Roberts). 
256. See id. at 19-20, 23. 
257. Id. at 18. 
258. Id. at 21. 
259. Id. at 19; cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[U]nless 
our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live 
together.”). 
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the color of such child.”
260
 The court read this prohibition on exclusion as a pro-
hibition on segregation in light of the 1870 state constitution’s directive that the 
legislature “provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all 
children of this State may receive a good common school education,”
261
 as well 
as an 1872 statute requiring school districts to “secure to all children the right 
and opportunity to an equal education in such free schools.”
262
 As in Tinnon, the 
court declined to decide whether the local policy violated the Fourteenth Amend-




In 1913, the Oregon Supreme Court in Crawford v. District School Board 
broadly surveyed state case law and, relying on Tinnon and Clark, held that 
“[w]hen the state Legislature has not passed an act expressly authorizing them 
to do so, school boards . . . have no lawful power to provide separate schools for 
the education of white and colored children.”
264
 The court found no such au-
thorization in a statute providing that children “may be admitted [to schools] on 
such terms as the district may direct.”
265
 Although this language was no less 
broad in its delegation of authority than the statute considered in Roberts,
266
 the 
Oregon court declined to follow Roberts, noting the subsequent ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and its interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court to 




The import of these decisions extended beyond segregation in schools. In 
1873, the Iowa Supreme Court applied its decision in Clark to affirm a jury ver-
dict in favor of a black woman who had been forcibly denied seating at a dinner 
table with white passengers aboard a Mississippi River steamboat.
268
 The Iowa 
court broadly held that “a common carrier cannot refuse to transport all persons 
without distinctions based upon color or nationality.”
269
 In 1890, the Michigan 
Supreme Court construed a state public accommodations law to prohibit racial 
segregation in restaurants.
270
 Relying on Clark, Tinnon, Longress, and its earlier 
 
260. 101 Ill. 308, 314 (1882). 
261. Id. at 313. 
262. Id. at 314. 
263. Id. at 316; cf. id. (quoting Clark v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 277 (1868)). 
264. 137 P. 217, 220 (Or. 1913); see id. at 220-21. 
265. Id. at 220. 
266. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 207-08 (1849). 
267. Crawford, 137 P. at 220 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880)). 
268. See Coger v. Nw. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145 (1873). 
269. Id. at 159. 
270. See Ferguson v. Gies, 46 N.W. 718 (Mich. 1890). 
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decision in Workman, the court redrew the distinction between social equality 
and “equality . . . before the law”: 
The man who goes either by himself or with his family to a public place 
must expect to meet and mingle with all classes of people. He cannot ask, 
to suit his caprice or prejudice or social views, that this or that man shall 
be excluded because he does not wish to associate with them. He may 
draw his social line as closely as he chooses at home, or in other private 
places, but he cannot in a public place carry the privacy of his home with 
him, or ask that people not as good or great as he is shall step aside when 
he appears. All citizens who conform to the law have the same rights in 
such places, without regard to race, color, or condition of birth or wealth. 
The enforcement of the principles of the Michigan civil rights act of 1885 
interferes with the social rights of no man, but it clearly emphasizes the 
legal rights of all men in public places.
271
 
As these examples show, there was a significant body of state decisions re-
jecting the legality of segregation when the Supreme Court decided Plessy in 
1896 and Gong Lum in 1927. Because these state decisions rested on state law and 
not the Fourteenth Amendment,
272
 it is unsurprising that Plessy and Gong Lum 
cited none of them. However, it must be recalled that Roberts, on which Plessy 
and Gong Lum relied, rested entirely on Chief Justice Shaw’s interpretation of 
the Massachusetts Constitution and education statutes, informed by his under-
standing of “equality before the law.” If it was appropriate for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to consider Roberts, then it should have also considered Clark, Tinnon, and 
the other cases just discussed. In those latter cases, it is evident that the state 
courts construed their constitutions and statutes with a presumption against the 
lawfulness of segregation. Neither the constitutions nor the statutes at issue 
clearly prohibited the challenged segregation, as the dissenting opinions in the 
 
271. Id. at 721; see also People v. King, 18 N.E. 245, 248 (N.Y. 1888) (rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge to New York’s public accommodations law and declaring: “It is evident that to exclude 
colored people from places of public resort on account of their race, is to fix upon them a brand 
of inferiority, and tends to fix their position as a servile and dependent people.”). 
272. One exception was an 1881 decision by Judge Pearson Church of the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas, squarely holding that a state law requiring segregated schools violated the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Commonwealth ex rel. Allen v. Davis, 10 Weekly 
Notes of Cases 156 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. of Crawford Cty. 1881). The opinion, which called the 
segregation law “a badge of servitude” and “the very personification of caste,” id. at 160, ably 
articulated the principles of racial equality encompassed by the Reconstruction Amendments. 
See KOUSSER, supra note 236, at 21-22 (discussing Allen). 




 The courts instead examined the basic meaning of “equality 
before the law” against the backdrop of emancipation, the Civil War, and the 
Reconstruction Amendments to derive the rule that school boards, even when 
vested with broad discretion over school attendance, had no power to segregate 
unless expressly authorized. In light of the background principles that informed 
these state decisions, the Court in Plessy was compelled to acknowledge that state 




At the same time, the fact that “racially egalitarian nineteenth-century judges 
crafted their final opinions in formally narrow terms of state law . . . greatly re-
duced the value of the decisions as precedents, even in their own states.”
275
 In 
Kansas, for example, despite Tinnon’s strong language condemning segregation, 
the state high court had no difficulty two decades later in Reynolds v. Board of 
Education (with different justices comprising the bench) holding that a statute 
expressly authorizing school boards to segregate students by race did not violate 
the state constitutional guarantee of “a uniform system of common schools” or 
the Federal Equal Protection Clause.
276
 Whereas Tinnon had declined to follow 
Roberts, the court in Reynolds quoted extensively from Roberts in concluding that 




Despite the significant number of decisions granting relief to black plaintiffs, 
the narrow state-law grounds on which they relied meant that “later lawyers and 
judges could more easily ignore, dismiss, or distinguish these rulings.”
278
 By 
contrast, as Kousser explains, the decisions upholding segregation “logically had 
to consider the more abstract, national questions of whether racial classifications 
were against the Fourteenth Amendment or fundamental notions of equal 
rights. Thus these latter, pro-segregation opinions . . . inevitably played a larger 
 
273. See People ex rel. Longress v. Bd. of Educ., 101 Ill. 308, 318 (1882) (Walker, J., dissenting); 
Clark v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 279 (1868) (Wright, J., dissenting); Bd. of Educ. v. 
Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1, 24-25 (1881) (Brewer, J., dissenting); People ex rel. Workman v. Bd. of 
Educ., 18 Mich. 400, 418-19 (1869) (Campbell, J., dissenting). 
274. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896). 
275. J. Morgan Kousser, Before Plessy, Before Brown: The Development of the Law of Racial Integration 
in Louisiana and Kansas, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
213, 217 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991). 
276. Reynolds v. Bd. of Educ., 72 P. 274, 277-81 (Kan. 1903); see Kousser, supra note 275, at 236-39 
(discussing Reynolds). 
277. Reynolds, 72 P. at 278; see id. (quoting Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206, 
208, 209 (1849)). 
278. Kousser, supra note 275, at 217. 
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C. The Road to Brown 
By the 1930s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple (NAACP) had become engaged in a legal strategy to dismantle school segre-
gation.
280
 The blueprint was the 1931 Margold Report, which urged litigation 
challenging “the constitutional validity of segregation if and when accompa-
nied . . . by discrimination.”
281
 The idea was that lawsuits directed at separate 
and unequal educational opportunities would highlight the difficult and often 
impractical task of equalization within a system of segregation and thereby invite 
“adjudication as a means of destroying segregation itself.”
282
 Although school-
equalization lawsuits seeking an integration remedy were not unprecedented, 
the approach evolved into a concerted strategy with the NAACP’s careful plan-
ning and commitment of resources. 
Charles Hamilton Houston, then dean of Howard Law School, sought to 
initiate the strategy at graduate and professional schools, where separate and un-
equal opportunities were most obvious.
283
 Conventional accounts focus on a 
progression of successful cases in the U.S. Supreme Court—Missouri ex rel. 
Gaines v. Canada,
284
 Sipuel v. Board of Regents,
285




279. Id. at 217-18. 
280. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 132-37 (1975); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S 
LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 21-33 (1987). 
281. TUSHNET, supra note 280, at 27-28 (quoting the Margold Report). The author of the report, 
Nathan Margold, was a young Harvard Law School graduate and “a protégé of Felix Frank-
furter.” Id. at 15; see also KLUGER, supra note 280, at 133. The Margold Report was, in the rec-
ollection of civil rights lawyer and professor William Hastie, “the Bible of the NAACP legal 
drive.” KLUGER, supra note 280, at 136. 
282. TUSHNET, supra note 280, at 28 (quoting the Margold Report). 
283. KLUGER, supra note 280, at 136. 
284. 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that the state policy excluding a qualified black student, a Mis-
souri citizen, from the University of Missouri School of Law and providing tuition payment 
for such student at an out-of-state law school violated equal protection). 
285. 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (holding that the exclusion of qualified black students from the University 
of Oklahoma School of Law, the state’s only public law school, violated equal protection). 
286. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that the disparity between opportunities offered to white stu-
dents at the University of Texas School of Law and opportunities offered to black students at 
a newly created law school at Texas State University violated equal protection). 
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rin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education
287
—that laid the foundation 
for Brown.
288
 Three of those decisions reversed the judgment of a state court.
289
 
However, the stepping stone to those decisions was a key ruling in 1936 by the 
high court of Maryland: Pearson v. Murray.
290
 
In the wake of unsuccessful suits challenging the exclusion of black students 
from state universities in North Carolina and Tennessee,
291
 the NAACP turned 
its attention to Maryland. Howard Law School graduate Thurgood Marshall had 
recently opened a law office in Baltimore,
292
 and in 1934, local attorneys found 
an ideal plaintiff who had been denied admission to the University of Maryland 
School of Law because of his race. Donald Murray, a Baltimore resident and 
graduate of Amherst College who hailed from a prominent black family, was 
amply qualified for admission. Yet his application was returned with a letter from 
the university president, Raymond Pearson, offering partial scholarships for at-
tendance at out-of-state law schools.
293
 Marshall and Houston took Murray’s 
case to Baltimore City Court. At trial, Houston “reduce[d] the defense to rubble” 
by eliciting testimony from Pearson and other state officials about the patent ra-
cial inequality in opportunities offered by Maryland’s university system.
294
 Un-
der questioning, Pearson also acknowledged that no money had been allocated 
for out-of-state scholarships at the time Murray’s application was rejected; the 
legislature had appropriated money for scholarships only after the initiation of 
Murray’s lawsuit.
295
 The trial court ruled for Murray and ordered his admission 
to the law school.
296
 
In affirming the trial court’s order, the Maryland Court of Appeals did not 
question the lawfulness of segregation per se but insisted that “[s]eparation of 
 
287. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that the segregation of a black graduate student in the classroom, 
library, and cafeteria at the University of Oklahoma violated equal protection). 
288. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 473-76 (7th ed. 2013); KATHLEEN 
M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 661-63 (19th ed. 2016); Dennis J. 
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 
GEO. L.J. 1, 4-30 (1979). 
289. See State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. 1937), rev’d, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Bd. 
of Regents, 180 P.2d 135 (Okla. 1947), rev’d, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 210 S.W.2d 442 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948), rev’d, 339 U.S. 629. 
290. 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936). 
291. See KLUGER, supra note 280, at 155-58; TUSHNET, supra note 280, at 52-55. 
292. See KLUGER, supra note 280, at 181-86 (recounting Marshall’s early days in law practice). 
293. See id. at 187-89. 
294. Id. at 189; see id. at 189-91. 
295. See id. at 189-90. 
296. See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 590 (Md. 1936). 
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the races must nevertheless furnish equal treatment.”
297
 The University of Mar-
yland School of Law was the state’s only public law school, and the opportunity 
to attend an out-of-state law school with a state scholarship was not “substan-
tially equal.”
298
 The court explained that receiving a scholarship was “far from 
assured” and that attending an out-of-state school would result in “considerable 
expense” even with a scholarship.
299
 Further, Murray “could not there have the 
advantages of study of the law of this state primarily, and of attendance on state 
courts, where he intends to practice.”
300
 The court said the number of black stu-
dents affected by the discrimination was irrelevant because “the essence of the 
constitutional right is that it is a personal one. . . . It is the individual who is 
entitled to the equal protection of the laws . . . .”
301
 With the state lacking any 
in-state alternative for blacks, students like Murray “must, at present, be admit-
ted to the one school provided.”
302
 “Compliance with the Constitution cannot 
be deferred at the will of the state. Whatever system it adopts for legal education 
now must furnish equality of treatment now.”
303
 
Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court faced a similar lawsuit and for the 
first time ordered the admission of a black student to a white school. The plain-
tiff, Lloyd Gaines, also represented by Houston, met the qualifications for ad-
mission to the University of Missouri School of Law but was rejected because of 
his race.
304
 The State asserted that the legislature had authorized the creation of 
a comparable law school for blacks “‘whenever necessary or practical’” and that, 
in the meantime, Gaines could apply for a scholarship that would cover tuition 
at “recognized schools” in adjacent states.
305
 In finding this arrangement to be 
an equal protection violation, the Court quoted Murray’s holding and deter-
mined that Missouri’s commitment to building a separate law school for blacks 
was no more definite than Maryland’s.
306
 As to the advantages or disadvantages 
of attending an out-of-state law school, the Court went beyond Murray in de-
claring “these matters . . . beside the point. The basic consideration is not as to 
 




301. Id. at 593-94 (quoting McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 
(1914)). 
302. Id. at 594. 
303. Id. 
304. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1938). 
305. Id. at 342-43, 346 (quoting State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783, 791 (Mo. 1937)). 
306. See id. at 345-48 (quoting Murray, 182 A. at 594). 
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what sort of opportunities other States provide, or whether they are as good as 
those in Missouri, but as to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white 
students and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color.”
307
 
Gaines then explained, as Murray had explained, that “limited demand . . . 
for the legal education of negroes” does not “excus[e] the discrimination in favor 
of whites” because the right to equal protection is “a personal one.”
308
 In addi-
tion, echoing Murray’s insistence on “equality of treatment now,”
309
 the Court 
rejected the State’s contention that the discrimination was merely “temporary” 
pending the establishment of a law school for blacks.
310
 These propositions, set 
forth in Murray and amplified in Gaines, led the Court to underscore in 1950 that 
Sipuel, Sweatt, and McLaurin “concern rights which are personal and present.”
311
 
By the time the Court decided these professional and graduate school cases, 
several lawsuits challenging segregation in elementary and secondary schools 
were moving forward in federal and state courts,
312
 including the four cases 
eventually consolidated in Brown. 
 
307. Id. at 349; see id. at 350 (“Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal 
laws can be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is 
there that the equality of legal right must be maintained.”). 
308. Id. at 350-51; see Murray, 182 A. at 593-94. 
309. Murray, 182 A. at 594. 
310. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 351-52. 
311. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950); see also McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher 
Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 640, 642 (1950) (holding that the segregation of a black doctoral student 
in the classroom, library, and cafeteria “deprive[d] him of his personal and present right to 
the equal protection of the laws”); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948) (citing 
Gaines in declaring that the state must offer legal education to black applicants “as soon as it 
does for applicants of any other group”). 
312. In California, a suit challenging the segregation of Mexican American students in several Or-
ange County school districts resulted in a judgment invalidating the practice. See Mendez v. 
Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 545, 551 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff’d, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 
1947) (en banc). In Arizona, black plaintiffs succeeded in challenging segregation in a Phoenix 
high-school district. See Phillips v. Phoenix Union High Schs. & Junior College Dist., No. 
72909, slip op. at 3 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 1953). Judge Struckmeyer acknowledged the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding in Gong Lum but said that “democracy rejects any theory of second-
class citizenship. There are no second-class citizens in Arizona.” Id. at 2. From the time that 
the principle “all men are created equal” appeared in the Declaration of Independence, he ob-
served, the trend “has been to constantly reconsider the status of minority groups and their 
problems . . . . In the spirit of this marked social maturity our Legislature abandoned manda-
tory segregation. A half century of intolerance is enough.” Id. His decision ultimately rested 
on the state-law ground that the legislature had unconstitutionally delegated to local school 
boards “the arbitrary power to segregate,” with no “standard, criteria or guide as to the cir-
cumstances under which such power may be exercised.” Id. at 3. 
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In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs argued that 
the “necessary and natural effect” of the segregation mandate in the state consti-
tution “is to prejudice the colored child in the sight of his community” and “to 
implant unjustly in him a sense of inferiority as a human being to other human 
beings.”
313
 Rejecting this claim, the three-judge federal district court opined that 
“the separation provision rests neither upon prejudice, nor caprice.”
314
 Rather, 
“it declares one of the ways of life in Virginia. Separation of white and colored 
‘children’ in the public schools of Virginia has for generations been a part of the 
mores of her people.”
315
 Segregation “has not been social despotism,” the court 
maintained; “whatever its demerits in theory, in practice it has begotten greater 
opportunities for the Negro.”
316
 Finding “no hurt or harm to either race,”
317
 the 
court affirmed that segregation per se did not violate the Constitution. The court 
went on to find “actual inequality . . . in respect to buildings, facilities, curricula 
and buses” in Prince Edward County, and ordered state and local officials “to 
pursue with diligence and dispatch” a plan to build a new high school for black 
students.
318
 The court did not order an integration remedy in the meantime. 
In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the three-judge district court 
noted that segregation had garnered “the unanimous approval of the Supreme 
Court of the United States [in Gong Lum] at a time when that court included 
Chief Justice Taft and Justices Stone, Holmes and Brandeis.”
319
 “[I]f conditions 
have changed so that segregation is no longer wise,” the court said, “this is a 
matter for the legislatures and not for the courts. The members of the judiciary 
have no more right to read their ideas of sociology into the Constitution than 
their ideas of economics.”
320
 The court went on to find that “the school facilities 
 
313. 103 F. Supp. 337, 338 (E.D. Va. 1952) (three-judge court); see id. (“[Plaintiffs] argue that in 
spirit and in truth the colored youth is, by the segregation law, barred from association with 
the white child, not the white from the colored, that actually it is ostracism for the Negro 
child . . . .”). 
314. Id. at 339. 
315. Id.; see id. (“The importance of the school separation clause to the people of the State is sig-
nalized by the fact that it is the only racial segregation direction contained in the constitution 
of Virginia.”); id. at 340 (“So ingrained and wrought in the texture of their life is the principle 
of separate schools . . . that its involuntary elimination would severely lessen the interest of 
the people of the State in the public schools, lessen the financial support, and so injure both 
races.”). 
316. Id. at 340. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 340-41. 
319. 98 F. Supp. 529, 537 (E.D.S.C. 1951) (three-judge court). 
320. Id. 
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furnished Negroes in District No. 22 [of Clarendon County] are inferior to those 
furnished white persons.”
321
 As for the remedy, the court opted to “direct the 
equalizing of conditions” rather than “enjoin segregation” because the inequality 
“results, not from the law, but from the way it has been administered.”
322
 The 
decision drew a lengthy dissent from Judge Julius Waties Waring, who said that 
“the present facilities are hopelessly disproportional” and that “[s]egregation is 
per se inequality” and “must go now.”
323
 
The claims of black schoolchildren received a warmer reception in the Kansas 
and Delaware cases. In the Brown case, the Topeka school board had addressed 
inequality between black and white schools to a degree that the plaintiffs “did 
not give it great emphasis” and instead “relied primarily upon the contention 
that segregation in and of itself without more violates their rights guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”
324
 The three-judge court found it “difficult to see 
why” segregation in the lower grades would not violate the same “right to com-
mingle with the majority group” that the U.S. Supreme Court had recently up-
held in McLaurin and Sweatt.
325
 Despite this logic, the district court considered 
itself bound by Plessy and Gong Lum, and denied relief
326
—but not without in-
cluding the following statement among its “Findings of Fact”: 
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detri-
mental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it 
has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually 
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of in-
feriority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the 
sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and 
mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of 





322. Id. Six months later, the court observed that the defendants had complied with the equaliza-
tion decree “as rapidly as was humanly possible,” and it again rejected the argument that “be-
cause [the schools] are not now equal, [the court] should enter a decree abolishing segrega-
tion.” Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920, 922 (E.D.S.C. 1952). 
323. Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 547-48 (Waring, J., dissenting). 
324. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan. 1951) (three-judge court). 
325. Id. at 800. 
326. See id. 
327. The passage is not included in the Federal Supplement reporter, but it is quoted in KLUGER, 
supra note 280, at 424. 
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Two years later, the Supreme Court quoted this passage as support for its asser-
tion that segregation imposes on black children “a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely 
ever to be undone.”
328
 
The Delaware case, Belton v. Gebhart, was filed in the Delaware Chancery 
Court and came before Chancellor Collins Seitz.
329
 In 1950, then-Vice Chancel-
lor Seitz had issued an opinion finding the blacks-only Delaware State College 
“woefully inferior” to the whites-only University of Delaware and ordering the 
admission of black students to the university.
330
 The opinion’s detailed and mul-
tidimensional analysis of educational quality, including observations from site 
visits to both institutions,
331
 presaged his approach in Belton to elucidating the 
disparities between black and white schools in New Castle County. 
In a comprehensive survey of conditions at the high-school level (again in-
cluding site visits), Chancellor Seitz concluded that “with respect to teacher 
training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical plants and aes-
thetic considerations, the Howard-Carver School [for blacks] is inferior to Clay-
mont [for whites] under the ‘separate but equal’ test.”
332
 The facilities, in par-
ticular, were “vastly superior” at Claymont than at Howard-Carver.
333
 The 
remedy, he explained, must be the admission of the plaintiffs to the white school: 
To do otherwise is to say to such a plaintiff: “Yes, your Constitutional 
rights are being invaded, but be patient, we will see whether in time they 
 
328. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). By the time the Brown case reached the Su-
preme Court, the Topeka school board had decided not to defend the suit, and it declined to 
provide briefing or present oral argument. Only after the Court ordered a response from Kan-
sas Attorney General Harold Fatzer did the state, through Fatzer’s assistant Paul Wilson, par-
ticipate in the case. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 344 U.S. 141, 141-42 (1952) (per curiam); 
KLUGER, supra note 280, at 547-50. 
329. See Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952); KLUGER, supra note 280, at 430-33, 443-50 
(discussing Chancellor Seitz’s background and his role in Belton). A parallel case filed in fed-
eral district court was stayed pending the state court’s resolution of Belton. See Wilson v. 
Beebe, 99 F. Supp. 418, 421 (D. Del. 1951) (three-judge court). 
330. Parker v. Univ. of Del., 75 A.2d 225, 234 (Del. Ch. 1950). 
331. Id. at 231. 
332. Belton, 87 A.2d at 869. Chancellor Seitz also determined that travel times imposed a greater 
burden on the plaintiffs than on comparable white students and contributed to “inferior ed-
ucational opportunities.” Id. 
333. Id. at 868. The Carver building had no auditorium or gymnasium, a “makeshift cafeteria . . . 
in a dingy basement [with] neither seats nor tables,” only “one lavatory which has an unsan-
itary cement floor,” and inadequate playing space. Id. at 866-67. By contrast, Claymont had a 
gymnasium and “ample room for playground and equipment,” and was aesthetically “very 
attractive.” Id. 
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are still being violated.” If, as the Supreme Court has said, this right is 
personal, such a plaintiff is entitled to relief immediately, in the only way 
it is available, namely, by admission to the school with the superior facil-
ities. To postpone such relief is to deny relief, in whole or in part, and to 




Chancellor Seitz found similarly glaring inequalities between the black and 
white elementary schools and ordered the plaintiffs’ admission to the white 
school.
335
 On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld many (though not 
all) of Chancellor Seitz’s findings
336
 and, expressly disagreeing with the district 
courts in Briggs and Davis, refused to require the plaintiffs to “wait another year” 
for the state to equalize facilities: “If, as [the U.S. Supreme Court has held], the 
right to equal protection of the laws is a ‘personal and present’ one, how can 
these plaintiffs be denied such relief as is now available?”
337
 
In the Delaware courts, the separate-but-equal doctrine was given robust ap-
plication as courts required actual equality and ordered integration remedies 
when school authorities fell short. But equally significant was a portion of Chan-
cellor Seitz’s opinion in Belton addressing the constitutionality of segregation per 
se. He acknowledged he was bound by Gong Lum’s resolution of the issue
338
 but 
nevertheless determined from the plaintiffs’ “many expert witnesses,” and the 
fact that there were “[n]o witnesses in opposition,” that state-enforced segrega-
tion “creates a mental health problem in many Negro children with a resulting 
impediment to their educational progress.”
339
 Disputing Gong Lum’s implication 
that “a separate but equal test can be applied, at least below the college level,” 
Chancellor Seitz concluded that “[s]tate-imposed segregation in education itself 
results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities 
which are substantially inferior to those available to white children otherwise 
similarly situated.”
340
 He invited the U.S. Supreme Court “to re-examine its doc-
trine in the light of my finding of fact,”
341
 and he emphasized that it was no 
answer to say “the State may not be ‘ready’ for non-segregated education . . . . 
 
334. Id. at 869-70. 
335. Id. at 870-71. 
336. Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 144-52 (Del. 1952). 
337. Id. at 149. 
338. Belton, 87 A.2d at 865. 
339. Id. at 864. 
340. Id. at 865. 
341. Id. at 866. 
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The application of Constitutional principles is often distasteful to some citizens, 




As it turned out, the Court in Brown was listening: it quoted Chancellor Seitz 
alongside the district court in Kansas in concluding that segregation unconsti-
tutionally harms black children.
343
 The judgment of the Delaware courts was 
affirmed in Brown; the judgments of the federal courts in Virginia, South Caro-
lina, and Kansas were reversed.
344
 
D. After Brown 
In the wake of Brown, both state and federal courts confronted the question 
of how far states and local districts had to go toward integrating their schools. 
The district court in Briggs opened the bidding by declaring that the Constitu-
tion, as interpreted in Brown, “does not require integration. It merely forbids 
discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the result of vol-
untary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segre-
gation.”
345
 For a decade, Brown went largely unenforced in the South.
346
 Only 
after Congress and the President conditioned federal education funding on de-
segregation compliance did the U.S. Supreme Court require states and local au-
thorities to “convert promptly to a system without a ‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ 
school, but just schools,” and to “come forward with a plan that promises real-
istically to work, and promises realistically to work now.”
347
 
Desegregation would not have occurred to the extent that it did without the 
courage and integrity of federal judges, including the judges on the U.S. Court 
 
342. Id. at 864-65. 
343. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.10 (1954) (quoting Belton, 87 A.2d at 865). 
344. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
345. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955). 
346. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH 
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 37 tbl.10, 38 fig.10 (2003) (showing that 
the percentage of black students attending majority-white schools in the South increased from 
zero in 1954 to 2.3 percent in 1964). The extraordinary case of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 
(1958), in which President Eisenhower had called in the National Guard to supervise the in-
tegration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, was the exception indicative of a 
general posture of state or local noncompliance. 
347. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439, 442 (1968); see Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 
189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see generally 
Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW. L.J. 705, 713-17 (2004) (describing the 
Supreme Court’s limited role after Brown until Congress gave desegregation enforcement au-
thority to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). 
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit who supervised much of Brown’s enforcement in 
the South.
348
 But state courts were part of the story as well, in several instances 
articulating standards for desegregation under state law that went beyond the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In 1963, the California Supreme Court in Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dis-
trict condemned segregation whether practiced “openly and directly or indirectly 
by evasive schemes,” and declared that “the Fourteenth Amendment is violated 
where zoning is merely a subterfuge for producing or perpetuating racial segre-
gation in a school.”
349
 The court made clear that where residential segregation 
exists, school boards may not assign students to schools “on a geographic basis 
without corrective measures. The right to an equal opportunity for education 
and the harmful consequences of segregation require that school boards take 
steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools re-
gardless of its cause.”
350
 
In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court, with four Justices recently appointed by 
President Nixon, decided Milliken v. Bradley, the first of several cases holding 
that desegregation orders under the Federal Constitution must be limited to 
remedying the demonstrable effects of de jure segregation.
351
 But the California 
Supreme Court was undeterred. In Crawford v. Board of Education, the court 
acknowledged Milliken but went on to explain that no principled distinction 
could be drawn between de jure and de facto segregation.
352
 Adhering to its de-
cision in Jackson, the court unanimously said: “In California, all public school 
districts bear an obligation under the state Constitution to undertake reasonably 
 
348. See, e.g., Henry v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969); United 
States v. Bd. of Educ., 396 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 393 F.2d 
690 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967); 
Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965). See generally JACK 
BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIR-
CUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT’S BROWN DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR 
EQUALITY (1981) (describing the crucial role the Fifth Circuit judges played in desegregating 
the South). At the time, the Fifth Circuit encompassed what is now the Eleventh Circuit. 
349. Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878, 881 (Cal. 1963). 
350. Id. at 882. 
351. 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974); see Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 92-102 (1995); Freeman v. 
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991); Pasadena 
City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1976). 
352. See Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 33-42, 33 n.4 (Cal. 1976). 
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feasible steps to alleviate school segregation, regardless of the cause of such seg-
regation.”
353
 On this basis, the state high court affirmed a trial court order re-
quiring the Los Angeles Unified School District “to undertake reasonably feasi-
ble steps to desegregate its schools,” even if the segregation was de facto in 
nature.
354
 Crawford was superseded when California voters amended the state 
constitution in 1979 to prohibit state courts from ordering desegregation reme-
dies beyond what a federal court could order under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
355
 If anything, the action by the electorate underscored the countermajori-
tarian solicitude of the state high court. 
Two decades later, as the federal courts were winding down their desegrega-
tion efforts, significant litigation proceeded in state courts. In 1996, the Con-
necticut Supreme Court held in Sheff v. O’Neill that the state constitution “re-
quires the legislature to take affirmative responsibility to remedy segregation in 
our public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has occurred de jure 
or de facto.”
356
 The court declined to follow the narrower remedial standard un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment in light of the Connecticut Constitution’s guar-
antee of free public education and its express directive that “[n]o person shall 
. . . be subjected to segregation.”
357
 Further, the court observed that whereas “the 
federal cases are guided by principles of federalism” that counsel restraint in ex-
amining state action, “[p]rinciples of federalism . . . do not restrict our constitu-
tional authority to enforce the [state] constitutional mandates . . . .”
358
 Upon 
finding that minority students in Hartford had been denied “substantially equal 
educational opportunity that is free from substantial racial and ethnic isola-
tion,”
359
 the court issued a declaratory judgment and asked the legislature to take 
 
353. Id. at 42; see id. at 34 (reaffirming that school boards in California are constitutionally required 
to alleviate segregation “whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin”). 
354. Id. at 30; cf. id. (declining to affirm the portion of the trial court order “defining ‘segregated’ 
schools in terms of specific racial and ethnic percentages”). 
355. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a); see also Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 535 (1982) (up-
holding the amendment as constitutional and explaining that “Proposition I does not inhibit 
enforcement of any federal law or constitutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by its plain 
language the Proposition seeks only to embrace the requirements of the Federal Constitution 
with respect to mandatory school assignments and transportation”). 
356. 678 A.2d 1267, 1283 (Conn. 1996). 
357. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20; see id. art. VIII, § 1 (guaranteeing free public education); Sheff, 678 
A.2d at 1281-83 (discussing these provisions). But cf. id. at 1314-27 (Borden, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the phrase “subjected to segregation” in the state constitution means de jure, 
not de facto, segregation). 
358. Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1279 (majority opinion). 
359. Id. at 1286. 




 Since then, a number of settlement agreements have re-




In 2004, the New Jersey Supreme Court similarly affirmed that “‘[w]hether 
due to an official action, or simply segregation in fact, our public policy applies 
with equal force against the continuation of segregation in our schools.’ . . . 
[R]acial imbalance resulting from de facto segregation is inimical to the [state] 
constitutional guarantee of a thorough and efficient education.”
362
 The court ap-
plied this principle in the context of a petition by the Borough of North Haledon 
to withdraw from a regional high-school district comprised of three boroughs. 
Over time, North Haledon had assumed a disproportionate share of the funding 
burden for the district; meanwhile, the district’s demographics had changed 
from eighty-one percent white in 1991-92 to fifty-one percent white in 2001-02, 
with significant increases in black and Hispanic enrollments.
363
 The withdrawal 




North Haledon obtained approval for a proposed referendum on withdrawal 
from the state education department’s Board of Review, but the New Jersey high 
court held that the board’s approval violated “the constitutional imperative to 
prevent segregation in our public schools.”
365
 The court emphasized that both 
white and minority “[s]tudents attending racially imbalanced schools are denied 
the benefits that come from learning and associating with students from differ-
ent backgrounds, races, and cultures.”
366
 By accelerating the decline of white en-
rollment in the district, the court explained, “withdrawal by North Haledon will 
deny the benefits of the educational opportunity offered by a diverse student 
body to both the students remaining at Manchester Regional and to the students 
 
360. See id. at 1290. 
361. See GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 500 (6th ed. 
2015); Matthew Kauffman, Number of Hartford Students in Integrated Schools Drops by Hun-
dreds, HARTFORD COURANT (Dec. 20, 2017, 1:45 PM), http://www.courant.com/news 
/connecticut/hc-news-sheff-magnet-school-numbers-20171221-story.html [https://perma.cc
/9AR3-49FJ]. 
362. In re Authorization to Conduct a Referendum on the Withdrawal of N. Haledon Sch. Dist. 
from the Passaic Cty. Manchester Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 854 A.2d 327, 336 (N.J. 2004) (first 
alteration in original) (quoting In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application of Englewood on the 
Palisades Charter Sch., 753 A.2d 687, 692 (N.J. 2000)). 
363. See id. at 329-32. 
364. Id. at 332. 
365. Id. at 339; see id. at 342. 
366. Id. at 337. 




 The court invalidated the proposed referendum and 
ordered the state education commissioner “to develop . . . an equitable cost ap-
portionment scheme” to lessen North Haledon’s tax burden.
368
 
Finally, consider the U.S. Supreme Court’s last decision addressing school 
desegregation. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, the Court invalidated the voluntary, race-conscious efforts of Seattle and 
Louisville school officials to alleviate de facto segregation in their districts.
369
 
Many state and federal courts had held, to the contrary, that such efforts to rem-
edy de facto segregation do not violate equal protection.
370
 Justice John Paul Ste-
vens, dissenting in Parents Involved, quoted one of those state decisions, a 1967 
ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upholding a state statute 
mandating racial integration in public schools: “It would be the height of irony 
if the racial imbalance act, enacted as it was with the laudable purpose of achiev-
ing equal educational opportunities, should, by prescribing school pupil alloca-
tions based on race, founder on unsuspected shoals in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”
371
 There is actually a double irony here: the U.S. Supreme Court in Plessy 
and Gong Lum had relied heavily on the Massachusetts high court’s broad view 
of policymaking discretion when it worked to keep students of different races 
apart, yet the Court in Parents Involved took no guidance from the same Massa-
chusetts court’s broad view of policymaking discretion when it worked to bring 
students of different races together. In our increasingly diverse society, the chal-
lenge of creating schools where children of different races can learn to work and 
play together would seem to be a prime candidate for (at least) fifty-one imper-
fect solutions. 
 
367. Id. at 341. 
368. See id. at 341-42. 
369. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
370. See, e.g., Tometz v. Bd. of Educ., 237 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ill. 1968); Borders v. Bd. of Educ., 290 
A.2d 510, 517 (Md. 1972); Booker v. Bd. of Educ., 212 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1965); Vetere v. Allen, 
206 N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1965); Balsbaugh v. Rowland, 290 A.2d 85, 91-92 (Pa. 1972); see 
also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 826 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Tometz, 237 N.E.2d at 501 
(collecting cases)). 
371. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 801-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Sch. Comm. of Bos. v. 
Bd. of Educ., 227 N.E.2d 729, 733 (Mass. 1967) (footnote omitted)). The Massachusetts deci-
sion was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Court dismissed the appeal “for want 
of a substantial federal question.” Sch. Comm. of Bos. v. Bd. of Educ., 389 U.S. 572 (1968) 
(per curiam); see Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“That decision not 
only expressed our appraisal of the merits of the appeal, but it constitutes a precedent that the 
Court overrules today.”). 
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conclusion 
The case law on school segregation does not show that state courts were in 
the vanguard of protecting the rights of black schoolchildren or that they ex-
plored every avenue under the law for dismantling Jim Crow. Before Brown, 
there were plenty of state decisions that ratified the status quo. But there were 
also many state decisions that called segregation into doubt; short of holding it 
unconstitutional, state courts invalidated the practice on a variety of other 
grounds. It is true that none of the examples above involved state courts in the 
South, but it is not obvious that the federal courts in those jurisdictions per-
formed much differently, as Briggs and Davis suggest. The doctrine of separate 
but equal was a synthesis of state and federal decisions, and the undoing of the 
doctrine also featured the kinds of interactions between state and federal courts 
that Judge Sutton highlights throughout his book. Brown itself was a singularly 
bold accomplishment of the U.S. Supreme Court. But the history of segregation, 
before and after Brown, adds a further dimension to Judge Sutton’s refutation of 
the commonplace view that state courts cannot be trusted to protect individual 
rights. And it provides yet another example of state courts engaged in a shared 
constitutional discourse, not multiple state-centric discourses, with each other 
and with the federal courts. 
Justice Brennan’s 1977 paean to judicial federalism had particular resonance 
in light of the changing composition and increasingly conservative tilt of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. We may be at a similar moment today. But the call for judicial 
federalism in 51 Imperfect Solutions has a different message and comes from a dif-
ferent messenger. While sharing Justice Brennan’s faith in state courts as pro-
tectors of individual rights, Judge Sutton is not an apostle of individual rights 
maximalism. His book is not a response to anticipated backsliding by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in enforcing constitutional rights. Instead, Judge Sutton’s con-
cerns, like those of the Framers of the 1789 Constitution, are primarily structural 
and focus on the process by which individual rights take shape in our diverse 
democracy. By deepening our understanding of the federal-state balance and 
urging its recalibration in our legal culture, 51 Imperfect Solutions reminds us that 
the meaning of liberty, in whatever era, cannot be understood apart from the 
question of who decides. 
